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ABSTRACT 
Unwritten Law: Resilient Management in Latin American Artisanal Fisheries 
by 
Brandon Chapman, Master of Social Science 
Utah State University, 2004 
Major Professor: Dr. Douglas Jackson-Smith 
Department: Sociology 
111 
Latin American small-scale fishery production is crucial to local communities that 
count on fish as a key source of protein in daily consumption and for supplying the 
increasing demand for exported high-value species in the first world. Many small-scale 
fishing communities have exhibited various forms of informal institutions that serve to 
manage rights to the fishery, a common-pool resource (CPR). An emerging theme in the 
CPR management literature is that there are certain types of institutions that exist in 
successful informal management contexts. Seven case studies from small-scale fishing 
communities in Latin America are analyzed in order to determine if these model 
management institutions are supported. These case studies are then analyzed to determine 
what accounts for resilient informal management institutions in the face of commercial 
and outsider encroachment. The thesis is that robust shoreline activities promote 
reciprocity that allows for rapid collective action in the face of external threats. 
(135 pages) 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Small-scale fishing has historically been and continues to constitute a large 
portion of fish production for both first and third world peoples (McGoodwin 1990). 
With half the world's fish trade currently produced out of third world nations, 94 percent 
of the world's fishing fleets being defined as small-scale, and 65 percent of the world's 
fleet defined as artisanal, it is crucial to understand the problems-facing third world 
fisheries, especially the often overlooked low-technology sectors (F AO 2002). With 
about 27,000 large-scale commercial fishers in the world constituting 6 percent of the 
total amount of fishers, that leaves hundreds of thousands of fishers self-employed as 
small-scale operators (FAO 2002). In Peru for example, 70 percent offish food for direct 
human consumption is from artisanal fishers (Prado and Drew 1999). Net revenues from 
fish trade (exports minus imports) by developing nations recently reached $17.7 billion, a 
figure larger than that earned from their exports of such popular crops as tea, rice, cocoa, 
and coffee combined (F AO 2004). 
The percentage of the world's maritime production contributed by Latin 
American nations has risen since 1988 from 19 percent to over 22 percent and the region 
continues to be the largest contributor to world production of the eleven world fishery 
regions (FAO 2002). Aggregate data from 28 Latin American members of the 
intergovernmental organization the 'Latin American Economic System' (LAES) shows 
that while marine fishery production has decreased since 1996, the value of fish exports 
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has doubled since 1988 from 3.1 billion to 6.5 billion measured in U.S. dollars (FAa 
2002). One of the five emerging trends identified in worldwide fisheries by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAa) is that in developing nations, trade 
flows will reflect the export of high-cost / high-value species and the import oflow-cost / 
low-value species (FAa 2002). 
There have been declines in both total marine production in Latin America 
recently and in per capita production across fishing sectors since the 1980s. Couple that 
drop in production with declines in income and efficiency among the small-scale sector 
and it becomes apparent that third world small-scale fishers are under increased pressure 
to maintain or increase their output of high-cost / high-value species, even though 
increased amounts of these most valued harvests are being exported out of the 
community and out of the hands oflocal consumers. Maintaining a stable level of 
production to meet growing demand at home and abroad is increasingly difficult as the 
commercial sector has sharply increased their harvesting efforts in or near what have 
traditionally been small-scale fishing territories in the last half-century. These territories 
are most often adjacent to and informally claimed and managed by small-scale fishers in 
rural communities. Low-tech fishers, often residing in a rural peripheral community with 
weak backward economic linkages, must then compete with much more technologically 
sophisticated craft for a declining number of fish. Third world fishers are facing such 
emerging problems in this new era of commercial encroachment. 
1.1: Emerging Multifaceted Problems in Fisheries 
Fishing problems are multifaceted, but small-scale fisheries and the fishers that 
operate within them are especially vulnerable to these problems because of their 
peripheral position in the emerging era of commercial encroachment and international 
market demands. Decreases in efficiency and productivity in formerly abundant fish 
catch areas, increased technologies allowing for fleet effectiveness at cross-continental 
distances, and national and international industry legal structures adopted to increase 
foreign and national commercial investment and productivity have encouraged 
commercial encroachment on small-scale fishing communities. Small-scale fishers are 
thus being increasingly marginalized and specialized. Many must choose between 
competing with more technologically efficient and financially backed fleets or becoming 
integrated by these commercial operations into national and international fish markets. 
These external factors, coupled with fish stock depletion 'spillover' effects and rising 
internal conflict due to externally influenced marginalization and specialization have 
influenced the structure and effectiveness of informal institutions created by small-scale 
fisher communities to manage their fishery. 
There is an extensive literature that analyzes how many small-scale fishing 
communities have created and changed unwritten rules for rights to local fishing 
resources in response to these internal and external pressures. For example, fishers in a 
small community vulnerable to fish stock depletion can institute certain property rights 
systems. Fishing communities having problems with commercial encroachment can 
organize themselves to monitor and defend clearly defined fishing territories. These 
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infonnal management institutions take an endless variety of fonns, but there are some 
regularities that have been documented. Ostrom (1990), Baland and Platteau (1996), and 
others have constructed theoretical models of several institutional design principles 
associated with successful small-scale, user-managed common-pool resources. As 
expanded on in the next chapter, there is an extensive literature that argues that all of 
these problems can be solved, or at least decreased and lessened, by appropriate and 
effective institutional design and management practices. 
1.2: Research Outline 
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There is not only a Crisis in the World's Fisheries (Me Goodwin 1990), but also a 
crisis in infonnal fisheries management related to increases in population, consumption, 
technology proliferation, and inequalities (Burger, et. al. 2001). As the continued viability 
of often vulnerable informal management institutions in small-scale communities are 
being threatened, we need to properly understand under what conditions certain 
institutions succeed or fail. I began this study with two broad research questions: 
I. Do the often cited Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996) models for 
infonnal common-pool resource (CPR) management hold up in the case of 
Latin American fisheries? 
2. What factors increase the resilience oflocal management systems in the face 
of pressures from commercial encroachment in Latin American small-scale 
fisheries? 
The purpose of this paper is to show that there are unique cultural and social patterns in 
artisanal fishery communities that promote resiliency in the face of external threats. My 
thesis is that 'shoreline reciprocity networks' account for resiliency to external 
threats in Latin American artisanal fisheries. Ostrom's seven principles are effective 
in promoting successful management practices in Latin American artisanal fisheries in 
regards to maintaining traditional environmental, economic, and social health and 
relationships. Thus, CPR management institutions matter, but so do specific aspects of 
artisanal fishing culture that contribute to the resiliency of such institutions. 
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This chapter serves as a short introduction to the emerging and immediate 
problems of fisheries worldwide, trends in third world and Latin American fisheries, and 
how those problems and trends are addressed by the research questions. Chapter II 
provides a brief review of the CPR management literature, defines relevant CPR 
concepts, and provides an overview of debates on property rights systems and theories of 
creation and change in CPR institutions. Chapter III provides a synthesis of 
characteristics common to fisheries and notes how these pose unique problems for local 
fishery management. Characteristics of third world small-scale fisheries are unique and 
separate them from the commercial sector and other natural-resource use communities. 
Chapter IV outlines seven Latin American small-scale fishery case studies drawn from 
various previously published works. Chapter V concludes by addressing the two research 
questions and how these case studies provide examples of the specific adaptive responses 




COMMON-POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT THEORY 
There is an extensive literature that outlines how the various problems of fisheries 
summarized in chapter I are created, alleviated, and / or mediated by social and legal 
resource management institutions (McEvoy 1986). Much of the recent literature on small-
scale fisheries has documented the various forms oflocally designed management 
systems (Dyer and McGoodwin 1994). Ostrom (2001) provides the best synthesis of both 
resource and user characteristics that influence the likelihood that local users will create 
such informal management institutions in the first place. In this paper, I am more 
concerned with how such management systems succeed or fail once created and how they 
respond to external threats. 
There are three main sections in this chapter. Section 2.1 defines and clarifies key 
concepts used through the rest of the paper and that are widely used (and often misused) 
in the theoretical CPR management literature. Section 2.2 briefly summarizes the 
historical development of the major theoretical paradigms and debates in the CPR 
management and property rights literatures. Section 2.3 analyzes factors influencing 
success or failure in the maintenance and adaptation of CPR management. This chapter 
provides a framework of analysis for understanding the management institutions found in 
small-scale fishing communities. Such a theoretical literature review provides a solid 
base from which to understand the problems in small-scale fisheries associated with 
threats from non-local fishing pressure. 
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2.1: CPR Concepts 
A major problem with the CPR literature is that theorists have used certain 
concepts in vastly different ways. As Dolsak and Ostrom (2003) have most recently 
suggested, CPR researchers need to build a clear and precise conceptual foundation in 
order to effectively understand and disseminate research to each other. A common and 
clear conceptual language is particularly important when integrating works across diverse 
disciplines, from both the physical and social sciences (Pawson and Dovers 2003). 
A concept I use often in this paper is 'institution'. By 'institutions', I mean rules 
or constraints that are implemented in society in order to ensure compliance with a 
groups' decisions. With respect to CPRs, 'institutions' are the rules and conventions that 
establish peoples' relationships to natural resources (Gibbs and Bromley 1989). 
Institutions can be formal (codified laws) or informal (norms of behavior, conventions, 
self-imposed codes of conduct) that mold interactions between user groups and a CPR 
(North 1994). 
It is crucial to distinguish between 'common-property' and 'common-pool', two 
often used and interchanged concepts. Dietz et a1. (2002) define common-property as a 
certain type of resource management system imposed by users, not necessarily a 
characteristic of the resource itself. Common-pool is used to describe the resource itself. 
A common-pool resource is a resource that is unbounded. Examples of CPRs include 
ocean waters, pasturelands / rangelands, and the earth's atmosphere. Management of 
CPRs typically creates dilemmas concerning how to prevent the potentially unlimited 
exploitation and degradation that could result from unbounded access and withdrawal 
conditions. 
Common-pool resources can be managed through different property rights 
systems: open-access, common-property, individual private property, regional or state 
government owned property, or a mixture of some or all of these (Table 1). Thus, 
common-pool can mean open or closed access since 'common-pool resource' is what the 
acronym CPR stands for and management can be the common-property closed access 
systems and other institutions implemented on the CPR. 
Table 1. Types of Property Rights. 
1. Open Access 
Absence of well-defined property rights. Resource often unregulated and free to 
everyone. 
2. Communal Property 
Resource held by community of users. User community excludes outsiders. 
Users may self-regulate. 
3. State Property 
Resource rights held by government. Government can regulate access and 
exploitation. General public may have access as granted by government. 
Government can use force to enforce laws and even subsidize use by some. 
4. Private Property 
Individual has the right to particularly appropriate uses of the resource as 
socially defined. Individual also has the right to exclude others from these uses. 
Sometimes includes the right to prevent uses by others that interfere with his / 
her rights and the right to rent or sell the property to others. 
(Adapted from Feeny et. al. 1990). 
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'Management' in this paper refers to humans regulating human behavior 
(Acheson 1981). This usually involves the creation and maintenance of social 
institutions, whether informal or formal, to establish rules for property rights (Schlager 
and Ostrom 1993) and to control and allocate resource use. In this paper, management is 
a broader term than institutions. 'Management' refers to a set of specific 'institutional 
arrangements'. Institutions are the rules; management is the set of rules (thus, I refer to 
management 'systems' and management 'institutions'). 
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Because fishery resources are naturally chaotic and difficult to control they pose 
unique organizational challenges (McGoodwin 200 1). Such difficulties are a result of 
many factors, including the featurelessness of the resource, the open-access nature of 
open waters, and the fact that the extracted unit (the fish) are most of the time hidden 
from view and thus levels of extraction and exploitation are not easily estimated visually. 
Most international fisheries are pure 'open-access' systems with virtually no regulation 
from users or state actors. However, local, regional, and national fisheries have various 
forms of communal, state, and individual property rights systems. Understanding and 
further analyzing the management institutions of fisheries can have profound policy 
implications regarding what types of institutions work, do not work, what contexts allow 
for institutional adaptability to external threats, and in what contexts such successes and 
failures are apparent. 
'Management' is defined rather broadly here and it is important to distinguish 
between what it is and is not. Management institutions should not be confused with the 
popular 'cooperative' organizations used in a majority of fishery development projects 
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(Sabella 1980). There is also a distinction in fisheries development between capture 
fishery projects and aquaculture projects, where sometimes aquaculture (the fenced in 
raising of certain species offish) is promoted in a community also in a cooperative form 
of organization (Bort and Sabella 1992). The United Nations FAO is one of the most 
prominent policy designers and development project implementers concerning fisheries 
worldwide and it has historically viewed the cooperative as the best one-shot model of 
fishery development success (Meynell 1984, Jentoft 1986, Sabella and Bort 1991). The 
cooperative has also constituted the majority of fishery projects implemented by the 
World Bank (Pollnac 1991). 
'Cooperatives' can be either user-organized or implemented top-down by a 
regional government, state government, or an international development agency such as 
the F AO and are often created to reduce risk and uncertainty. Certainly this equates with 
management as do the social institutions often created by the formation of a community 
fishing cooperative. However, there is an important difference. Cooperatives do involve 
collective action among fishers, but often in the form of pooling economic and 
technological resources for the sake of maintaining or regaining control over prices 
received for fish catch and control over fishing equipment used in the community. A 
common example in Latin America is artisanal fishermen pooling their money as 
collateral for bank loans in order to purchase multiple outboard motors for the collective 
and for 'cooperative' use since many of these economically peripheral fishers do not have 
the necessary capital alone to purchase such equipment (Sabella 1980). Fishery 
'management', on the other hand, does not necessarily involve such pooling of resources 
or gaining control of external markets. Also, 'management' involves regulating human 
behavior 'on the waters', while 'cooperatives' are not always associated with such 
institutional regulation of fishing effort. So 'cooperatives' are more concerned with 
community organization and institutions 'on-shore' (pooling resources and controlling 
external markets), while 'management' exists more abstractly and is concerned with 
regulating 'on the water' behavior. 
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There are three main types of CPR management systems: folk (often referred to as 
'traditional' also), state, and co-management (Acheson 1989). Folk management systems 
are the focus of this paper, where local community members and / or local resource users 
develop and maintain rules for rights over the particular CPR (Berkes and Farvar 1989). 
State management is where government at any level (international, national, regional, 
local) is the only authority for developing and maintaining such rules. Co-management 
lies between these two extreme ends of the management spectrum and is a combination 
of these two systems, where authority is shared between local resource users and one or 
various levels of government. 
Management systems can be informal or formal. Formal systems have written 
rules, while informal systems do not. Most folk systems are informal and most state 
systems are formal. That is, the CPR case study literature has shown that the state 
formally codifies various management institutions onto paper, which legitimizes such 
institutions in the event they are challenged legally. Meanwhile, folk management 
institutions often do not exist formally and instead exist cognitively by local resource 
users. Rules are enforced, other users monitored, rulebreakers sanctioned through 
informal unwritten social norms. Unwritten law can take many forms, from more 
common-property to private property for example. 
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There are four main types of property rights systems recognized by almost all of 
the existing CPR literature: open-access, communal, state, and private (Burger, et. al. 
200 1, Feeny, et. al. 1990, see Table 1). Each or combinations of these systems can be 
present along the two scales of 'informal to formal' and 'folk to state'. These four 
systems differ along four dimensions: (a) nature of ownership, (b) rights and 
responsibilities of owners, (c) rules of use, and (d) the center of control (Burger, et. al. 
200 1). These serve as conceptual anchors and do not always exist in singular and pure 
forms in real-world CPR situations. Edwards and Steins (1998) provide an excellent 
overview of 'complex commons', which more accurately represents how common-pool 
resources are operated under various property rights systems in the real world. They show 
that ePRs are generally mixed systems combining two or more ofthese concepts (for 
example, some individuals may hold special private areas, while the rest of the resource 
is held in common or by the state). Also, some users may perceive part of the CPR to be 
open-access, while it is actually held formally or informally under property rights. 
Thus, 'complex commons' are those cases where a bounded CPR has either 
multiple property rights systems existing simultaneously or different users perceiving and 
attempting to use areas as open-access when they are in fact held under certain property 
rights. Different users use some ePRs for different extractive purposes, such as a river 
flowing in front of a community being used for both fishing by coastline fishers and for 
irrigation water by inland agriculturalists. These cases of 'multiple-use commons' are 
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often where multiple property rights systems and their respective management 
institutions are found. In these cases, it is not only the heterogeneity and multiplicity of 
users that must be taken into account, but also the heterogeneity and multiplicity of uses 
(with their respective management systems). 
This synthesis of definitions across the CPR management literature is useful for 
developing a conceptual framework that has general applicability while maintaining most 
of the main terms used historically. In the next section, I explore how these concepts have 
been utilized in larger theoretical debates on why and how certaiu CPR management 
institutions are created, maintained, and changed, with emphasis on the historical 
development of the major paradigms and debates in the CPR management literature. 
2.2: Debates Over CPR Management 
I divide the historical trajectory of the CPR management theory literature into two 
main eras, the focus on rational choice theorizing from the 1950s to mid-1980s and the 
rise of collective action management and critique of rational choice theorizing from the 
mid-1980s to the present. While there is some disagreement, these two categories 
represent the main classifications of CPR literature over time and represent how CPR 
theorizing has been centered on rational choice theory since its origins and the various 
critiques of that theory arising in the mid-1980s. While a handful of empirical case 
studies began critiquing rational choice theory in small-steps through the 70s and 80s, it 
was not until 1986 with the publishing of the National Research Council's Proceedings of 
the Conference on Common Property Resource Management and Arthur McEvoy's The 
Fisherman's Problem that such critiques of rational choice CPR theorizing were 
synthesized and articulated within the larger debate. 
2.2.1: Rational Choice Origins 
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The main CPR theoretical debate has historically centered on rational choice 
theory. The origin of CPR management as a topic with its own distinct literature area and 
associated specialized theorists and scholars was the publication of Garrett Hardin's 
classic article "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968). The thrust of Hardin's argument is 
that common-property (which he sees as a CPR lacking regulation and interpersonal 
information) will tend to be over-exploited until it becomes unsustainable for future 
generations. This is because Hardin applies rational choice theory in this article, that 
individuals are self-interested acting to maximize their own gain. Hardin's solution to the 
tragedy is "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (p. 1247). Hardin's 'mutual 
coercion' represents a simplified pre-cursor to the user management institutions favored 
by so many subsequent CPR theorists. 
The 'fisherman's problem' (McEvoy 1986) is an example of Hardin's tragedy as 
seen in relatively unregulated oceans. Under open-access conditions, fishers of all types 
and abilities know that the other fishers harvesting the same waters will profit from their 
catch and that takes away from their potential catch and profit. Economists using rational 
choice theory define the 'fisherman's problem' as when fishers are in competition to 
harvest as much as they can as efficiently as they can since they know that their potential 
harvest will be decreased as others fish in the same waters without limitations. When 
there is no individually held value, as in many open-access CPRs, there is no reason to 
sustain the resource. 
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More recent rational choice theorists have applied these earlier models to 
individual and group action concerning CPR management systems (Ostrom 1990, McCay 
and Acheson 1987). These theorists adopt the perspective that a CPR presents 'social 
dilemmas' because of their assumptions that a CPR is a resource susceptible to open-
access exploitation, as self-interested utility maximizing individuals will necessarily 
attempt to use as much of the resource as beneficial to them and thus create externalities 
for other users. Even when a community organizes collectively to create informal 
institutions for managing the resource, this creates a public good wherein all community 
users can benefit from the public good without necessarily contributing. Although 
monitoring and sanctioning rules can be agreed upon to solve this free-rider dilemma, this 
process of rule enforcing itself creates another level of public good dilemma (Ostrom 
2001). From a rational choice theory of collective action, resolving such 'social 
dilemmas' is at the root of all management (Ostrom 1998). This is why rational choice 
theorists often use repeated game theories to reproduce and solve such dilemmas. 
2.2.2: Private Property Rights 
Initial problems of over-exploitation, hyper-competition, and economic 
inefficiency noted by rational choice theory often explain why users come together in 
voluntary association to create CPR management institutions. Such management 
institutions can protect the resource by closing access to certain users. Private property 
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rights can create individual user or user group incentives to sustain the value (and 
therefore, the extractable unit integrity) of the resource for future generations because the 
user(s) owns all or part of the resource. Thus, one positive argument for private property 
rights is it allows individuals to plan for the future. 
Two of the earliest advocates of private property rights in fisheries were 
economists H. Scott Gordon and Anthony Scott. Gordon theorized that the marginal 
return from fishing is zero, which explained why many fishers are so poor. This is 
because under open-access conditions costs rise proportionally with the amount of effort 
expended. He argued that a closed-access system limiting entry should be devised 
because maximum economic return can be achieved only by balancing efforts / costs with 
amount of catch, and by eliminating hyper-competition that continually reduces the 
proportion of benefits as more effort is needed to harvest more fish under an increasing 
number of entering fishers. Privatizing the fishery would then maximize economic return 
and ecologically conserve the fishery (Gordon 1954). Scott has made the same claim, 
initially in his 1955 article and subsequently in his later works (Scott 1955, 1979, 1988). 
There is considerable debate between advocates for either private property rights 
or common-property rights as a means for conserving natural resources. On one side, 
Stevenson (1991) argues that private property is more efficient than common-property, 
assuming that transaction costs are equal. Simmons and Schwartz-Shea (1993) argue that 
private property arises out of conservation concerns. The private property argument is 
based on two key assumptions: that private property rights are created as a response to 
open-access problems and that such management institution creation is mainly for the 
purposes of conservation. 
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At the same time, the conservation of a resource has been the main reason for 
local CPR resource users to create common-property management institutions and to 
justify the costs that follow with creating, enforcing, and changing them. However, 
Durrenberger and King (2000) point out that informal management institutions are not 
necessarily created out of a conservation ethic to facilitate sustainable use of a CPR. 
Rather, the environmental, economic, and social dynamics that illfluence the creation of 
such informal management needs further research (2000). Certainly, some informal 
management institutions have no clear connection to conservation and sustainability 
issues. One example is the often-studied coastal fishermen of Caye Caulker just off the 
mainland shore of Belize (King 1997a, 1997b, 2000). However, many CPR scholars 
agree that whatever the initial motivation for creation or change to new forms of 
management institutions, the resulting maintenance of such informal institutions can curb 
environmental degradation that may have otherwise been inevitable under open-access 
conditions (Burger, et. al. 2001). 
Researchers that take a less economic approach to CPR management have even 
argued that fisheries in particular are difficult, if not impossible, to divide up into private 
property and therefore automatically require collective management institutions (Burger, 
et. al. 2001). However, there are numerous case studies of rather successful informal 
management based on private fishing territories and 'visual triangulation' that rebut this 
side of the debate. See chapter III (section 3.3) for an overview of 'visual triangulation' 
and chapter IV for Latin American examples of such case studies (Cordell 1984, 
Sutherland 1986). 
2.2.3: Critiques of Rational Choice 
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Scholars of various other disciplines increasingly critiqued the rational choice 
model beginning in the 1970s as not adequately accounting for societal structures or 
forces (McEvoy 1986). What Hardin misconceptualized was the nature of the 'commons' 
itself. Rather than being an inherent flaw of common-property, open-access and poorly 
defined property rights are what really caused Hardin's 'tragedy' (Burger, et. al. 2001). 
His article should have been titled "The Tragedy of Open-Access". 
Aside from Hardin's well-documented 'tragedy', there is also the 'tragedy of the 
anti-commons'. This is when the tragedy of over-exploitation occurs within individual 
private property rights, a closed-access system. This can be due to simple poor 
management by a private owner and is often cited by advocates of common-property. 
Even when resources are divisible and privately owned, ensuring conservation to protect 
the well-being and use needs of future generations cannot be accomplished by individuals 
acting out of self-interest alone (Burger et. al. 2001). 
Thus, critics of Hardin have focused on his general lack of accounting for 
collective action. At the same time, critiques of early rational choice theorists question 
their behavioral assumptions and faith in private property. Ostrom (200 I) is one who has 
questioned the assumptions of these earliest rational choice 'economic' type theories of 





The resource unit extracted is highly predictable and consistent 
Users are homogenous in assets, skills, discount rates, and cultural views 
Users are short-term profit maximizers that possess complete information 
Users act independently without coordinating their activities 
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These assumptions of rational choice theory often reduce CPR management to a one-shot 
or repeated game theoretic, such as a prisoner's dilemma (Dasgupta and Heal 1979). It 
was the main perspective on CPR management through the mid-1980s when more 
examples arose showing an absence of private property rights in favor of communal 
property, and variables explaining the heterogeneity of actors became more defined 
(Ostrom 2001, Petrzelka and Bell 2000). 
Numerous anthropologists have questioned the assumption of economic 
rationality or other grand theories of human nature since "man is so entangled with where 
he is, who he is, and what he believes" that there is no one "human nature" independent 
of time, place, and cultural context (Geertz 1973: 35). This human constructed culture is 
what enables communities to do what Hardin's theoretical pastoralists could not do: adapt 
their behaviors to changing environmental, economic, and social conditions by creating 
management institutions. Indeed, this is what makes humans human, our ability to 
conceive the changing world around us and consciously manipulate our relationship with 
it (McEvoy 1986). Experimental research on individuals' motivations to cooperate has 
revealed that individuals may not always act just in their own self-interest (Ostrom 1998). 
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It is important to note that most critiques of the rational choice paradigm are 
devoted to debunking some of the assumptions ofthe theory and has done little to refute 
its empirical validity (Ostrom 2001). Such critiques have also tended to over-state the 
assumptions of rational choice, not taking into account the inherent flexibility of this 
often stereotyped perspective (Mueller 2003). 
Besides critiquing the generalizability of rational choice theory and the often pure 
private property rights advocacy of this perspective, much of the current CPR literature 
also critiques pure state government management as environmentally, economically, and 
socially inefficient when compared to more localized informal systems. Problems with 
state ownership include the cultural and social distance between state managers and local 
users, reliance on higher-tech engineering, and the need for non-local labor to monitor 
and maintain the system (Ostrom 2001). As a result of these critiques, co-management 
has emerged as one potential solution to CPR management dilemmas (Durrenberger and 
King 2000). 
Cole (2002) concludes that there is no one type of property rights system that is a 
correct model for most contexts. With private property rights advocates, it is often 
assumed that such rights effectively decrease externality such as pollution. Ifit is the 
absence of property rights that explains pollution, then what explains the absence of 
property rights? Thus, Cole arrives at the heart of the problem: what are the costs of 
defining different forms of property rights? He concludes it is the economic, institutional, 
technological, and ecological context that will determine the transaction costs of all forms 
of property rights systems and thus determine which type of rights are most appropriate 
for the specific context. 
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The most recent CPR management literature agrees mostly with Cole's position, 
expanding beyond property rights systems and noting that the wealth of case studies 
collected on informal CPR management systems shows us that certain environmental, 
social, and technological contexts allow for the creation and maintenance of diverse types 
of informal CPR institutions (Burger, et. al. 200 1). Thus, such contexts need to be further 
delineated in order to better understand under what conditions informal CPR 
management institutions work or fail (Burger, et. al. 2001). 
2.3: Creation, Maintenance, and Adaptation of Local Management Systems 
The previous section briefly summarized rational choice theory that shaped the 
origins of what has become CPR management theory and the ensuing critiques of this 
paradigm that have led to increasingly complex theoretical models of CPR analysis. This 
section briefly summarizes three emerging complex themes in the CPR management 
literature. Section 2.3.1 outlines the pieces of the 'CPR Puzzle', the basic framework of 
requirements in managing a CPR. This compares costs and benefits between informal and 
formal CPR management systems regarding creating, maintaining, and changing rules. 
This 'CPR Puzzle' encompasses a major theoretical breakthrough of the recent CPR 
literature, that CPR management institutions are not static and subject to modification 
and change. Section 2.3.2 introduces two models outlining design principles of CPR 
management that have been shown effective in numerous case studies. These models are 
the basis for the first research question of this paper. Section 2.3.3 expands upon the 
theoretical development of management as a dynamic variable. This section is the basis 
of analysis regarding the second research question and introduces the concept of 
'resiliency' . 
2.3.1: The CPR Puzzle 
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Ultimately, management of ePRs through informal institutions requires two main 
accomplishments: limiting access (closed access conditions, deciding who will be 
excluded and how) and limiting harvest (because the taking by one user will affect the 
takings of another) (Burger, et. al. 2001). 
So why are informal systems sometimes preferable to formal systems? It is 
important to briefly contrast perceived costs and benefits of formal vs. informal systems 
to better understand why one community may develop and maintain one system and 
another might choose a different approach. Holling (1986) shows that CPR choices can 
occur when management systems are vulnerable or under stress. 
There are three types of transaction costs to consider when choosing between 
formal or informal CPR management systems. First, there are costs associated with 
creating rules. Second, there are costs associated with enforcing rules. With legal 
property rights systems, sanctioning relies on the judicial system and can exhibit high 
transaction costs. Libecap (1978) argues that operating through the 'due process oflaw' 
contributes to low efficiency in the courts and creates high time and money costs. By 
contrast, informal property rights systems usually involve coordination games between 
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users, and rules are agreed upon through some form of explicit or implicit voting 
procedures. Mueller (2003) provides a thorough overview of types of voting procedures. 
These agreed upon rules include monitoring and sanctioning to oversee and punish users 
that are rulebreakers or free-riders. In order for informal systems to be more attractive, 
they need to have low individual transactions costs for monitoring and sanctioning these 
rulebreakers. In a context where users have the option of choosing between formal and 
informal systems, the system with lower transaction costs for monitoring and sanctioning 
is usually more advantageous. 
Third, there are also transaction costs to consider in both types of systems when 
users attempt to change these rules. Transaction costs can be high in both types of 
systems, but changing rules presents a different set of characteristics in each. Transaction 
costs to change rules tend to be higher in informal systems because, unlike in formal 
systems where the rules are written, a user has to prove a rule actually exists. Rules in 
informal systems exist not on paper, but in human behavior. To change human behavior 
is usually more costly and a more difficult venture than to change written law. 
2.3.2: Principles of Success 
There are several models in the CPR literature that discuss the institutional 
characteristics and context associated with successful CPR folk management systems 
(Ostrom 1990, Baland and Platteau 1996). These models examine the informal 
management institutions that have been successfully transferred across generations of 
CPR users in a large number of local case studies. These successful folk management 
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systems are also credited with maintaining and enhancing local environmental, economic, 
and social health. 
The best-known work on local CPR management comes from Elinor Ostrom 
(2001, Dolsak and Ostrom 2003). Ostrom's model identifies seven 'principles' associated 
with successful local CPR management systems. First, well-delineated and stable 
boundaries around the resource are key since they reduce the transaction costs of 
identifying potential incursions by those from outside the community (Dolsak and 
Ostrom 2003, Ostrom 2001). Such boundaries help to alleviate potential 'tragedies' of 
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pure open-access. Second, there must be congruence among key elements. Initially, the 
distribution of benefits and costs upon each individual user from rules must be roughly 
perceived as fair and equitable, as well as be fair and equitable in practice. Also, such 
appropriation rules assigning benefits and costs to individual users must be adapted to 
specific local conditions (Ostrom 2001). Thus, rules must be congruent to and coincide 
with real and perceived equity and unique local conditions. The third design principle 
involves collective-choice arrangements that define an oversight process whereby 
appropriators can change the rules if needed. If the voice and interests of these 
appropriators are not heard, then they may 'exit' or perhaps will even begin to cheat the 
rules and norms of the community causing rises in enforcement costs and potential 
breakdown of the management system (Hirschman 1970). Lack of input from all users 
decreases transfer of information among users and can endanger community management 
institutions by causing stagnation and slower responses to change (Ostrom 2001). 
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The fourth and fifth principles reflect the presence of effective monitoring and 
the use of graduated sanctions to make sure rulebreakers are caught and that 
punishment is appropriate and at least pervasive enough in order to promote rule 
compliance and even increase self-monitoring. If rulebreakers are not properly monitored 
(and this comes to the attention of many in the community) conflict-resolution 
mechanisms can breakdown because the cost of enforcing rules increases. Sixth, 
successful management systems must have efficient and effective conflict-resolution 
mechanisms. Transaction costs must be low for conflict-resolution. Finally, it is 
important that local, regional and state governments recognize the informal, unwritten 
management practices. The more legal recognition is given to informal management 
institutions, the less likely future disputes over state vs. common / private property and 
access to such CPRs will be challenged judicially (Ostrom 2001). 
The lack of anyone of these seven crucial principles (see Table 2) can cause a 
breakdown in the management system that can then be the catalyst for fundamental 
change (Holling 1986). 
Ostrom's model does contain an eighth design principle, 'nested enterprises' that I 
do not include here because this is applicable to CPRs that are managed across analytical 
levels. This principle is applicable to an emerging area of theorizing in the CPR literature, 
that of overlapping or nested commons across temporal and spatial scales. Global 
commons such as air and ocean pollution are distinguishable from other singular level 
CPR management systems in that management institutions that can and are affected by 
the problem exist across local, regional, and or national levels (Burger et. al. 2001). 
Table 2. Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring CPR Institutions. 
1. Clearly defined boundaries. 
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the 
CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and / or quantity of 
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labor, material, and / or money. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements. 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying 
the operational rules. 
4. Monitoring. 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are 
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators. 
5. Graduated sanctions. 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated 
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other 
appropriators, by officials accountable to those appropriators, or by both. 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms. 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to 
resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize. 
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The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by 
external government authorities. 
Adapted from (Ostrom 1990: 90). 
Baland and Platteau (1996) offer a second model that succinctly summarizes other 
CPR models, including Ostrom's, while adding a few principles of their own (see Table 
3). In addition to Ostrom's seven factors, they add: 
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1. Low costs of exclusion technology 
2. High physical overlap between the CPR and users' residences 
3. High demands for the resource 
4. High user knowledge of sustainable yields 
5. Small size of user group 
6. High mutual obligation and concern for social reputation between users 
The principles from these two models can be divided into three main categories. 
Ostrom's model includes two principles that concern the physicaL environment 
characteristics of the CPR (principles #1 and #2) and the five other principles outline 
what forms of institutional arrangements affect successful CPR management. Baland and 
Platteau incorporate six of these seven principles, one physical and all of the management 
institutional, into their model. They add a third category of factors, characteristics of the 
user group that extend Ostrom's model. 
The main disagreements between the two models concern the effects of user 
group 'size' and the importance of other social and cultural attributes of user groups. 
While Baland and Platteau argue size and CPR success are negatively correlated, Ostrom 
concludes that the data on how size and heterogeneity of users affect collective action is 
inconclusive (Ostrom 2001). Most of the classics on collective action through the 1960s 
to 1970s adopt the rational choice perspective and logically concluded that the larger a 
group of maximizing individuals, the less likely collective action will succeed as shown 
by repeated game theories (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). However, examples drawn 
from irrigation CPR settings provide evidence to the contrary. Tang (1992) and Lam 
Table 3. Factors influencing the likelihood of successful collective action. 
1. The resources. The smaller and more clearly defined the boundaries ofthe 
common-pool resources, the greater the chance of success. (Ostrom #1) 
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2. The technology. The lower the costs of exclusion technology (such as fencing) 
the better the chances of success. 
3. Relationship between resources and user group. 
a. Location: the greater the overlap between the location of the common-
pool resources and the residence of the users, the better chance of success 
b. Users' demands: the greater the demands (up to a limit) and the more 
vital the resource for survival, the greater the chances of success 
c. Users' knowledge: the better their knowledge of sustainable yields, the 
greater the chances of success 
4. User group characteristics. 
a. Size: the smaller the number of users the better the chances of success, 
down to a minimum below which the tasks able to be performed by such 
a small group cease to be meaningful (perhaps because, for reasons to do 
with the nature of the resource, action to mitigate common property 
problems must be done, if at all, by a larger group). ( data inconclusive) 
b. Boundaries: the more clearly defined are the boundaries of the group, the 
better the chance of success (similar to Ostrom #1) 
c. Relative power of sub-groups: the more powerful are those who benefit 
from retaining the commons, and the weaker are those who favor sub-
group enclosure or private property, the better the chance of success 
(similar to Ostrom #3) 
d. Existing arrangements for discussion of common problems: the better 
developed are such arrangements among the users, the greater the 
chances of success (matches Ostrom #6) 
e. Extent to which users are bound by mutual obligations: the more 
concerned people are about social reputation, the better chance of success 
f. Punishments against rule-breaking: the more the users already have joint 
rules for purposes other than common-pool resource use, and the more 
bite behind those rules, the better the chances of success (Ostrom #5) 
5. Noticeability. Ease of detection of rule-breaking free-riders: the more 
noticeable is cheating on agreements, the better the chances of success. 
Noticeability is also a function partly of 1, 3a, and 4a. (similar to Ostrom #4) 
6. Relationship between users and state. Ability of state to penetrate rural 
localities, and tolerance oflocally based authorities: the less the state can, or 
wishes to, undermine locally based authorities, and the less the state can enforce 
private property rights effectively, the better chance of success. (Ostrom #7) 
Adapted from (Baland and Platteau 1996: 286-288). 
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(1998) both show that the smallest groups they studied (with only a handful of users) did 
not perform better on any of a series of environmental and economic performance 
measures compared to their largest groups (which ranged from 300 to 475 members). It is 
crucial when analyzing size to understand 'jointness of supply', whether or not the costs 
of providing a public good remain stable with an increase in numbers of users. With such 
varying examples on size, it is most accurate at this point in the debate to say that size has 
a curvilinear relationship to success (Ostrom 2001). Homogeneity and size are often 
related in the CPR management literature as many theorists often see a positive 
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relationship between size and heterogeneity (Ostrom 2001). Homogeneity is often 
measured by user similarity across four main variables: assets, skills, discount rates, and 
cultural views / attitudes (Ostrom 2001). 
For the purposes of empirically testing these models against Latin American case 
studies as outlined in my first of two research questions for this paper, I have combined 
these two models into one overall set of principles theorized to account for CPR 
management success (see Table 4). This synthesis includes all seven of Ostrom's 
principles as well as three additional principles from Baland and Platteau (excluding 
'costs of exclusion technology', 'physical overlap between the CPR and users' 
residences', and 'size') for a total often principles. 'Costs of exclusion technology' is 
discounted since the case studies I will be analyzing in chapter IV do not exhibit forms of 
exclusion technology. Rather, exclusion of outsiders is based on monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms already covered by Ostrom's model. 'Exclusion technology' is 
more applicable to CPR resources such as rangelands where physical exclusion markers 
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such as fences are present, whereas in fisheries such physical markers are often not. 
'Physical overlap' is discounted along similar grounds as 'exclusion technology'. This 
factor is more applicable to other types of CPR resources such as rangelands and forests 
where users' residences can and sometimes do exist on the CPR itself. In such cases 
'overlap' can be measured, but in fisheries, users' residences do not exist physically on 
the waters, they do not overlap the CPR. 'Size' is discounted for reasons mentioned 
previously. 
Table 4 presents the combined model I will be testing in c}1apter v. It includes 
principles from the three categories across both models. The first two principles are 
concerned with physical environment characteristics. Principles #2 through #7 are 
concerned with management institution arrangements. Principles #8 through #10 are from 
Baland and Platteau. These three are not 'design principles' or rule arrangements like the 
previous six factors that seek to control human behavior or are part of the institutional 
structure of CPR management, but rather they are characteristics of the user group. 
Table 4. Model of Effective and Resilient CPR Management Principles. 
l. Clearly defined boundaries. Individuals or households who have rights to 
withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the 
boundaries of the CPR itself. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. 
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Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and / or quantity of resource 
units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labor, material, 
and / or money. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements. Most individuals affected by the operational rules 
can participate in modifying the operational rules. 
4. Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator 
behavior are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators. 
5. Graduated sanctions. Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be 
assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the 
offense) by other appropriators, officials accountable to those appropriators, or both. 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Appropriators and their officials have rapid 
access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between 
appropriators and officials. 
7. State tolerance of local management systems. The rights of appropriators to devise 
their own management institutions are not challenged by external authorities. 
8. Users' demands for the resource. Demands must be high (up to a limit) and the 
resource needs to be seen as vital for survival. 
9. User knowledge of sustainable yields. Users' knowledge of sustainable yields 
needs to be high. 
lO. Mutual obligation and concern for social reputation between users. The extent 
to which users are bound by mutual obligations and their concern about their social 
reputation need to be high. 
Adapted from (Ostrom 1990:90; Baland and Platteau 1996:286-288). 
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2.3.3: Resilience to Change 
In his classic work on human environmental adaptation, Holling (1986) theorizes 
that fundamental changes in natural resource management institutions can only occur at 
points of deep crisis in the environmental and social systems when the accumulation of 
perceived failures in those systems exceed the perceived benefits of the management 
institutions. It is this sort of fundamental change that can be equated with a complete 
breakdown in traditional management systems that have existed informally in small-scale 
communities for generations. Changes that were unforeseen by lo.cals, such as the 
commercial fishery encroachment explained above, can cause the breakdown of informal 
CPR management systems. With a growing number of such examples of management 
system breakdown in recent years, an emerging theme in the CPR literature has been an 
evaluation of the resiliency oflocal management institutions to forces of change. 
'Resilience' generally refers to the magnitude of disturbance a system can absorb 
before it fundamentally changes or breaks down (Berkes and Folke 1998). Resilience has 
been applied in the natural resource management literature by examining the dynamic 
feedback mechanisms and changes between social and ecological systems (Gunderson et. 
al. 1995, Gunderson and Holling 2002). Applied to informal folk CPR management, 
'resilience' is the capacity of that management system to absorb disturbances while 
maintaining its traditional behavioral processes and structure (Berkes et. al. 2003). 
For most authors, management is itself a variable (a part of the social system) 
subject to fundamental breakdown or change. Local user groups that can effectively 
develop particular adaptive responses to external disturbances are those that can promote 
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resiliency in their management system and maintain their unwritten laws. The 
development of appropriate adaptive responses depends on context. The main factors that 
most often influence such effective adaptive responses are: high user group reciprocity, 
rapid and inclusive collective action mechanisms, and effective management institution 
learning mechanisms. Institutional learning involves a continual commitment by users to 
gather and analyze data, whether by observational or more formally scientific means, in 
order to keep aware of changes and trends in the environmental and social systems that 
constitute the CPR system (such as integrating feedback from the. ecological and social 
systems into management decision-making). Incorporating such observations in 
management discussions and operations is one major key to effective adaptive response 
(Berkes et. al. 2003). These three factors are highly inter-dependent. 
The development of specific adaptive responses to change promotes flexibility on 
the part of the local users, but also enhances the long-term resiliency and maintenance of 
traditional informal management institutions themselves. The case studies presented in 
chapter IV provide evidence of the adaptive and flexible responses of artisanal fishing 
communities in Latin America in the face of external pressures. 
Management institutions that are resilient to change over time through context-
appropriate adaptations are the ones that are likely to promote environmental, economic, 
and social health for present and future generations (Durrenberger and King 2000, Dolsak 
and Ostrom 2003). Whatever types of property rights and rules an informal CPR 
management system exhibits, it is change over time that tests the strength and determines 




The previous chapter outlined the 'nature' of the fishery as a CPR that is often 
times under certain types of management control and institutional design. This chapter 
outlines the numerous 'problems' specific to fisheries of all types, shows how those 
problems are inter-connected, and focuses on problems unique to third world artisanal 
fisheries. There are four sections in this chapter. Section 3.1 briefly distinguishes between 
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the types of fisheries and fishing fleets across environmental, economic, and social 
variables. Section 3.2 summarizes a set of emerging and inter-linked trends and threats 
across all these types of fisheries. Section 3.3 provides an outline of the unique 
challenges faced by third world artisanal fishing communities. This section also specifies 
how these challenges affect small-scale fishery management institutions. Section 3.4 
briefly restates the goals of the paper and relates the research questions to the specific 
discussions on fishery challenges and fishery management. 
3.1: Types of Fisheries 
Social and Economic Subsectors 
The fishing industry is distinguished mainly by technology and ownership. 
Commercial fleets are typically harbor-landing and motorized. Commercial fleets also 
tend to be owned by non-operator investors, which can be public (Sabella 1980) or 
private (Sutherland 1986). In the commercial sector, high costs of entry and maintenance 
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on more advanced and modernized forms of technology most often results in the owners 
being distant investors, private companies, and others that are not directly the fishers 
themselves. 
A sub-category of the commercial sector is the 'ultra-modem' sector (Kurien 
1978). The ultra-modem sector constitutes one extreme end on a spectrum of types of 
fisheries, and is characterized by five factors (Platteau 1989a, Finlayson and McCay 
1998): 
• The use of sophisticated modem technologies of boat range and exploitation 
capacities that allow for international water traversing and intense fish catches 
often with giant trawler nets 
• The employment of trained crews whose specialized qualifications and long-
journey work patterns are far removed from the more generalized and close-
to-shore fishing of small-scale fishers 
• Orientation toward the demands of more urbanized markets and foreign 
consumers / investors, with few sales to the local community which often 
leads to 'catch and run' behavior 
• Greater emphasis on strict quality control procedures 
• Strong ties to modem processing plants 
At the other end of the spectrum are small-scale fisheries. Small-scale includes 
fisheries of a wide array of characteristics and sizes in different contexts. Two main 
characteristics distinguish small-scale fishing fleets from commercial fleets. First, small-
scale fleets generally consist of all beachlanding units. Second, small-scale fleet owners / 
proprietors are usually the fishers themselves (Platteau 1989a). This sector uses smaller 
and less sophisticated technologies. The reliance on beachlanding is associated with the 
use of traditional wood-dug and reed-sewn canoes and rafts though modem small-scale 
fishers often add an outboard motor or implement new materials and designs 
(McGoodwin 1990). Small-scale fisheries require less heavy infrastructure such as 
anchoring and harboring facilities, boats can be decentralized and dispersed along a 
coastal shoreline or community. Because of the relatively simple technology associated 
with beachlanding boats, most owners are also operators. They art the local fishers 
themselves. 
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A sub-category of small-scale is 'artisanal'. The main distinguishing characteristic 
separating 'artisanal' as a sub-category of the small-scale sector is technology. 'Artisanal' 
fishers are non-motorized and typically do not purchase or use fishing materials obtained 
from outside the community. This is why they are 'artisanal', they rely on relatively 
crude local materials to fabricate all their own fishing technology. This artform requires 
tremendous skills, intuition, and experience to operate such self-crafted equipment 
(McGoodwin 1990). 
The continued growth of commercial encroachment has increased the number of 
commercial and small-scale fishers working side-by-side in the same local and regional 
waters and increased complex economic integration and linkages between the two 
sectors. Most, if not all, fishers in this era of commercial encroachment are selling at least 
a portion of their catch either by delivering to regional markets or selling to closer 
community markets that are linked to more distant markets and their price fluctuation 
dynamics. 
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To summarize, small-scale fishing is distinguished as all owner-operated 
beachlanding boats. The 'artisanal' fisheries are the non-motorized portion of the small-
scale sector. The 'ultra-modem' and the 'artisanal' represent the two extreme ends of the 
fishing sector spectrum on the basis of technologies and are usually associated with their 
own unique economic and social organizational linkages and patterns. They constitute the 
ideal types of the competing sectors when analyzing commercial.encroachment. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that beyond the main distinguishing factors for 
each of the four categories I have described, there are numerous examples of fishers in 
the middle of the spectrum that overlap these categories. 
Environmental Subsectors 
Fisheries are also distinguished by the environmental nature of the fishery itself. 
There are rather straight-forward terms such as 'maritime' and 'riverine' that describe the 
physical ecosystem of a fishery (oceans and rivers, respectively). The most crucial and 
often confused terms are 'in-shore' and 'off-shore' areas in maritime fisheries. For the 
purposes of this paper, 'in-shore' waters are the coastal territories the majority of small-
scale and / or artisanal fishers in a community exploit. These territories usually form a 
stretch of coastline along the adjacent community shore, characterized by shallower water 
depths (compared to 'off-shore' waters) and are therefore more conducive to exploitation 
by fishers using low-technology crafts that are often too difficult to operate far from 
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shore. 'Off-shore' waters are the territories more distant from shore most often used by 
high-technology commercial fleets. Their technologies, such as trawler nets, are more 
conducive to deep-water exploitation. Although the exact distance separating 'in-shore' 
from 'off-shore' waters depends on the particular marine ecosystem, most often the two 
can be distinguished by analyzing the limits to artisanal fleet distance from shore. 
Commercial fleets often do enter and exploit these in-shore territories, which is an 
increasing problem for small-scale fishing communities. 
3.2: Trends and Threats 
3.2.1: Collapse of Fisheries Worldwide 
At the end of the twentieth century, there is an emerging set of environmental, 
economic, and social problems that adversely affect all types of fisheries worldwide (see 
Table 5). Environmentally, over-exploitation of fish stock may be occurring in the 
context of exponential world population growth as measured by two factors: decreased 
amount of catch per unit of fishing effort (decreased efficiency) and a decrease in the 
world's per capita fish production (McGoodwin 1990, Fairlie 1995, Acheson et. al. 
1998). Even though the total annual fish catch steadily increased from the 1850s to the 
1960s, starting from 2 million tons growing to 55 million tons (with a doubling from 20 
to 40 million tons in only ten years from 1950 to 1960), the rate of growth leveled off in 
the 1970s (growing slightly from 66 million tons in 1971 to 72 million tons by 1980, a 
pronounced decline in growth rate from 5 percent per year between 1945 and 1970 to 
only 1 percent per year through the 1970s). A more recent increase to over 90 million 
tons by the end of the 1980s reflects accelerated fishing efforts and more intensive 
harvest technology, mainly in the commercial sector (Platteau 1989a). 
Table 5. Emerging Trends and Threats in Fisheries. 
Commercial 
Environmental Severe 
• fish stock depletion 
• species extinction 
Economic Moderate 
• decrease in per capita 
fish production 
• profitability with rising 
Small-Scale 
Severe 
• fish stock depletion 
(sometimes due to 
spillover effects) 
• species extinction 
Severe 
• decrease in per capita 
fish production 
• decrease in efficiency 
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costs • level of integration with 
commercial 
encroachment 
• tourism encroachment 
Social Low Severe 
• community survival 
• mgmt. institutional 
credibility 
• relations with 
government 
• level of integration with 
commercial 
encroachment 
• tourism encroachment 
The recent growth in fish harvests does not mean the amount of fish available for 
harvest is increasing. Rather, advances in fishing technology (especially in the 1980s) 
allowed commercial and motorized fleets to harvest a wider range of species previously 
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unavailable at depths and places never before exploited in order to raise the overall 
amount of the world's fish catch (McGoodwin 1990). An early 'take-off' point in this 
technological advancement was when commercial fleets implemented technologies 
developed during the industrial boom years of World War II. By the 1960s, inexpensive 
steel construction, diesel engines, shipboard refrigeration and automated freezing, 
electronics for more precision long-distance and night navigation, long-distance 
communications, and bottom-imaging and fish-finding monitors all were available. This 
produced new 'factory-freezer trawler' fleets that were equipped to fish around the clock, 
over long distances, and able to sweep the oceans more efficiently with trawler nets while 
gathering more fish with fewer transaction costs (Finlayson and McCay 1998). 
However, this 'bonanza' period of trawlers sweeping the oceans clean soon grew 
over-saturated, leading to a decline in efficiency and productivity in the 1970s. Also 
affecting the growth of worldwide fish catch may have been the more stringent U.S. 
policy acts of the 1970s that were enacted because of increasing concerns of ecological 
limits and a fundamental reconceptualizing of the human-nature relationship by the 
environmental movement. Policy such as the Marine Mammals Protection Act and the 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act lessened the contribution of U.S. catch 
amounts to worldwide totals over the last three decades (McEvoy 1986). 
So while the total number has risen, the two key factors of catch per unit of 
fishing effort (efficiency) and the world's per capita fish production have steadily 
decreased. While commercial efficiency may be generally rising (F AO 2002, 2000), 
small-scale efficiency seems to be declining (McGoodwin 1990, Brown 1978). In a study 
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of various types and sizes of fishing fleets worldwide by the FAO through the mid-1990s, 
an important finding was that the extreme low-technology end of the fishery spectrum 
was one of the few sectors losing capital and efficiency. This was attributed mainly to 
over-exploitation of fishery resources and competition from more efficient and 
technologically sophisticated commercial capture technologies, such as purse seiners and 
coastal trawlers (FAO 2000, FAO 1999, NOAA 1999, Stergiou 1989, Akpalu 2002). 
The world's per capita fish production remained steady through the 1990s at 
about 15 to 16 kg if China's recent boom in the last 20 years in b~th marine and 
aquaculture production are accounted for (F AO 2002). However, when Chinese 
production is excluded, per capita fish production appears to have steadily declined since 
the 1980s from about 15 kg to 13 kg in 2001 (FAO 2002, FAO 2000). While the total fish 
catch has continued to rise through the last decade to over 90 million tons, there is 
concern that the rate of increase in total fish harvests will eventually drop to zero as it 
reaches the ocean's maximum aggregate annual productivity level (estimated to be near 
100 million tons) (McEvoy 1986). 
This means there still may be a growing, stable, or decreasing absolute amount of 
fish in the world's seas, but such a measure does not necessarily matter. The relative 
amount offish per human has decreased with the exponential growth of the world 
population since 1950. That, coupled with an increase in the number of fishers on the 
seas has caused fisher efficiency to decrease (McEvoy 1986). While the debate continues 
on whether or not the absolute number of fish available is growing or declining, such an 
argument may be erroneous as fisher efficiency and per capita productivity are steadily 
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decreasing, while growth in population and higher incomes have led to a rise in the 
demand for fish (Platteau I 989a). It no longer appears that fish will be adequate to feed 
the world's poor (Durrenberger and King 2000). These trends have also placed increased 
pressure on commercial and small-scale fisheries seeking to meet demand in nearby 
regional and urban markets. 
Commercial fisheries also have seen an emerging problem of fish extinction and 
fish 'undergrowth'. There has been extensive documentation of the near extinction of the 
northern cod between the Labrador and the Grand Banks of Newfoundland where the use 
of new technologies led to over-exploitation of a major commercial fishery (Finlayson 
and McCay 1998, Finlayson 1994, Milich 1999, Haedrich and Hamilton 2000). The once 
massive anchovy reserves offthe central coast of Peru were over-exploited to near 
extinction in the mid-70s (Clark 1977). Salmon in the Pacific Northwest (Taylor 1999) 
and whitefish in Canadian freshwater lakes (Handford et. al. 1977) have entered 'new 
evolutionary paths' of 'undergrowth' resulting from the use of technologies such as large-
sweeping trawler nets with smaller and more firm netholes leading to selective harvest of 
larger fish that allow only smaller fish to escape and reproduce. This 'undergrowth' has 
been associated with a decrease in fisher efficiency, where a fisher can now catch the 
same number of fish in such areas, but tonnage has decreased since the fish are 
increasingly smaller (Russell 2003). 
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3.2.2: Commercial Encroachment on Small-Scale Fishing Communities 
While both commercial and small-scale fisheries share the problem offish stock 
depletion, there are other economic and social problems that are unique to small-scale 
fisheries. Many of these problems are heavily influenced by commercial fish fleet 
competition and encroachment. One example is fish stock depletion that is often the 
result of 'spillover' effects. 'Spillover' effects result from the fact that ocean waters are 
an 'overlapping' natural resource where a wide array of user communities from different 
regions and nations are connected by migrating fish stocks (Burger et. al. 200 1). This 
'overlap of jurisdiction' not only makes the oceans and their connecting waterways a 
CPR for management purposes, but also the ocean ecosystem itself is connected across 
these jurisdictional boundaries as well. Thus, more commercial fishers catching fish or 
even overexploiting a fish to extinction in one part of the ocean will have 'overlapping' 
effects on nearby communities that also use that ocean. Northern cod overfishing does 
not only affect Newfoundland, but surrounding regions fishing out of the Northern 
Atlantic as well. Even inland riverine fishery stocks are often not safe and adversely 
affected from over-exploitation in adjoining oceans (McEvoy 1986). Such environmental 
problems are shared by all types of fisheries, including inland riverine fisheries connected 
to the ocean ecosystem, and show the externalities of commercial technology and 
harvesting methods. This creates an emerging problem for fisheries management as 
institutional responses to such spillover problems will have to be coordinated between 
institutions, between various user communities, and across scales of management (Burger 
et. al. 200 1). 
44 
A common explanation for decreases in efficiency and productivity emphasizes 
the 'open-access' nature of ocean fisheries. 'Open-access' is a case of poorly defined 
property rights where individuals or groups have access to extract units from a resource 
without any fear of sanction or punishment because there is supposedly no management 
system in place (Burger, et. al. 2001). However, this view ignores not only the 
aforementioned advances in technology, but also the formal and informal management 
institutions of small-scale fishing communities that often affect in-shore and off-shore 
sectors of a local fishery (Finlayson and McCay 1998). Thus, the.reasons for over-
exploitation and loss of efficiency and productivity in fisheries can be conceptualized as 
an institutional problem in the 'rules of the game', beyond a simple explanation of too 
many people chasing too few fish (McEvoy 1986). 
With some commercial fleets overexploiting fish stocks or losing efficiency, 
many are searching for new territories on these 'open-access' seas to maintain or increase 
their catches to satisfy markets and the demand for fish (McEvoy 1986). Commercial 
encroachment is a major emerging problem in small-scale fisheries (McGoodwin 1990, 
Finlayson and McCay 1998). With establishments ofexc1usive economic zones (EEZs) 
under the authorities granted by the United Nation's Law of the Sea (signed by most 
nations in 1982, with the notable exception of the U.S.), numerous third world coastal 
nations are encouraging distant-water fleets to exploit their maritime resources for the 
potential economic gains associated with increases in foreign investment and export sales 
(Platteau 1989a, Royce 1987). With such legal encouragement for outside commercial 
encroachment facilitated by the state, small-scale fisheries are increasingly vulnerable to 
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not only national commercial fleets, but also an increasing body of international 
commercial fleets. This can destabilize local and regional markets by suddenly 
incorporating the small-scale fishery into a larger globalized fish trade market. This often 
creates forward linkages, but little to no backward linkages. It also potentially places the 
community in a dependent relationship within globalized north-south fish trade markets, 
supplying the first world with fish for relatively low prices in return. Such encroachment 
continues to push vulnerable small-scale fishers to more specialization and 
marginalization in order to compete in certain regions (McCully 1991). 
It is important to note that there is not always such a stark contrast of two types of 
fleets competing side-by-side. Rather, in some cases economic and social absorption and 
incorporation can occur. Small-scale fishers may be hired to work as crew on the growing 
commercial fleets, they may collaborate with commercial fleets by acting as 'ferries' 
transporting crews and catches to and from shore with commercial fleets that are too 
large or lack docking facilities, and they may gain access to commercially important 
processing and service facilities and manufactured inputs that exist on shore (Platteau 
I 989a). 
Even when encroachment on small-scale fishers has produced some positive 
benefits, there still exist problems of increasing inequality, outsider community control, 
and a possible increase in the peripheral status of the community within a larger 
economic market. McCully (1991) suggests that there is an emerging 'technological 
dualism' between commercial and small-scale fishers. Higher costs of production for 
catching fish and the introduction of highly exploitative technology' such as giant trawler 
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nets in the last half century has only benefited large commercial fleets with access to 
more capital, technology, and political power than peripheral small-scale fishers. Thus, a 
rise in non-worker fleet owners and small-scale dependence on merchant financiers has 
emerged. 
3.2.3: Emerging Problems in Third World Fisheries 
In the third world, including Latin America, there are unique problems associated 
with small-scale fisheries. Historically low levels of economic deNelopment and 
persistent drains on national budgets from external debt makes funding regional fishery 
councils for licensing, issuing and monitoring quotas, and sanctioning rulebreakers very 
difficult (Cordell 1984). Many developed nations (such as the U.S.) fund regional 
councils for such management purposes, because they have enough capital to do so. 
Meanwhile, in the third world many local communities are left to themselves to somehow 
perform the costly functions of controlling open-access, limiting technological growth, 
and stopping or regulating commercial encroachment. This unique third world problem 
can sometimes generate successful collective action as communities left to their own 
devices seek to control technologically-advanced and well-funded fleets entering their 
waters. Rather than focusing all of their limited resources on community fishery 
management and having a state-financed body that regulates and is more connected to 
external fishing fleets, third world fishers often have to manage and adapt to these 
external threats by themselves shifting time and energy away from fishing effort and 
internal fishery management (such as concentrating on monitoring and sanctioning 
rulebreakers). 
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Internal conflict between community users themselves can also arise for a variety 
of reasons. Rather unique to certain third world and Latin American communities is 
growth in inequality of fish catch between two or more groups that each have exclusive 
access and / or expertise in differing forms of exploitive technology, such as net building 
materials (Seixas and Berkes 2003). In certain isolated periphery communities that 
exhibit stable or dwindling traditional populations because of cOniinued out-migration, 
fish stocks can not only stabilize but also increase and produce greater inequalities among 
community fishers due to differences in access and expertise in various exploitive 
technologies. Such small communities may find successful collective action difficult 
even though their fishery resource is quite abundant. 
An additional problem specific to third world and Latin American fisheries is 
tourism encroachment. There is an emerging literature that attempts to understand how 
tourism is either destroying, integrating, or marginalizing local third world peasants' 
economic livelihoods. Although this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
important to note that tourism encroachment is significant in many Latin American small-
scale fishing communities that exhibit high-amenity values (Seixas and Berkes 2003). 
Tourist amenities such as adequate waves for surfing, attractive shoreline landscapes, and 
stable mild temperatures make a community an attractive tourist destination for many 
first world vacationers (Balagna 2002). 
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3.3: Unique Challenges of Fisheries Management 
The purpose of this section is to review the ecological factors and organization of 
work / labor that present unique challenges for fisheries management. The focus is on the 
characteristics common to fisheries of all types with consideration for how each of these 
characteristics operates within small-scale and artisanal fisheries. Often, how a 
characteristic operates in a fishery will be compared to how a similar characteristic 
operates in other natural resource sectors (agriculture, forestry, rangeland pastoralism) in 
order to highlight the unique nature of fisheries. These characteristics need to be taken 
into account when analyzing fishery communities and their respective management 
systems as they all can influence management creation, maintenance, and outcomes 
(Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981, McGoodwin 2001). 
The fisheries development literature provides information about the range of 
variables that define the challenges of fisheries management. These are summarized in 
Table 6 below. In their work on fisheries development projects, Pollnac (1991) and 
McGoodwin (2001) specifically account for the uniqueness of fisheries and the social 
variables that affect the success or failure of 'participatory' projects. Their conclusions 
are based on direct development field experiences and have been observed as occurring 
across fisheries of certain types. Acheson (1981) has also noted how fishers face 
distinctive risks and uncertainties and exhibit an organization of livelihood unique to their 
profession that must be accounted for when analyzing fishery communities' management 
systems. These characteristics paint a more specific picture about what is most crucial in 
building a theory of fishery management beyond the large literature on CPR 
management. 
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Table 6. Unique Challenges of Fisheries. 
Category Commercial 
Ecological Factors 
Fishing is Inherently High 
Unpredictable 
Featurelessness of Open High (maritime) 
Waters 
High Rate of 
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Severe Severe 
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3.3.1: Ecological Factors 
Fishing is Inherently Unpredictable 
There are three ways in which all types of fishing waters (maritime, riverine, etc.) 
across all types of fishery sectors (commercial to small-scale) are unpredictable. Those 
are: rapid tide and waterflow shifts due to weather change, the extracted units (sea, river, 
and lake creatures such as fish, plankton, etc.) are highly mobile, and these units are not 
easily seen (Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981). These three unpredictabilities influence a 
fourth, the volatile nature of fishery production (McGoodwin 200l). All types of fisheries 
are vulnerable to extreme seasonal production fluctuations influenced by unpredictable 
weather patterns that often cause hard-to-track fish to suddenly shift location (Clark 
1976, Cushing 1977). 
In some cases, these four unpredictabilities do become more predictable over time 
as fishers continually adapt and become more experienced with a body of water. 
Knowledge passed down generations provides some means to reduce uncertainty 
(Acheson 1981). Increased predictability largely depends on whether tide / waterflow 
shifts and thus production occur in long-term 'seasonal' cycles or if these cycles shift 
more frequently on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis (McGoodwin 2001). The most 
predictable resources are those where there is a relatively long time period of resource 
stability with seasonal shifts that occur with some regularity. 
The unpredictable nature of fisheries ecology can influence the types of and 
evolution of CPR management institutions (McGoodwin 200 I). In order to be resilient, 
management institutions need to be flexible and allow the re-allocation of fishing 
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territories (if specific territories are used by specific fishers) when seasonal shifts cause a 
decrease in particular fishing spots or the entire fishery managed by a community 
(Acheson 1981). In cases where specific territories suddenly decrease in production, 
management institutional mechanisms for redistribution of catch or territorial allotment 
that are perceived as inclusive and fair by fishers can ease the impacts of such drastic 
changes in the fish stock (Pollnac 1991). In cases where an entire community fishery 
witnesses a drop in production, management institutional mechanisms for maintaining 
local/regional market linkages and 'middle-men' that are often a main source of income 
for small-scale fishers can prepare for such downshifts by surplusing, increasing the 
resilience of the system (Acheson 1981). 
Featurelessness a/Open Waters 
The 'featurelessness' of open water hinders dividing the resource into specific 
parcels for the sake of privatizing property rights or fishing territories (McEvoy 1986). 
With other natural resources and ePRs parceling is easier since forests, rangelands, and 
croplands are land-based often having stable boundary-markers that can be securely 
allocated (Smith 1977). The unpredictabilities of specific fishing spots further hinder 
boundary maintenance efforts among community fishers (Pollnac 1991). With fisheries 
then, the transaction costs of allocating and enforcing private property rights can often be 
the highest of any natural resource (Acheson 1981, Smith 1977). This characteristic is 
most severe in maritime fisheries where the 'openness' and 'featurelessness' of the open 
sea is so vast that specific fishing territories can only be marked by "'visual triangulation' 
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(Pollnac 1991, Forman 1970). This process of 'visual triangulation' of boundary-marking 
private property rights, sea-tenure, and other forms of fishers rights to specific fishing 
territories is most often done on the basis of two visual features: shoreline markers and 
distance from shore (Chapman 2003, Sutherland 1986). These features serve as a visual 
guidepost to fishers while out on the waters and enable them to familiarize themselves 
enough with specific territory markers in order to more effectively place nets and gear 
within their area. When the community group of fishers recognizes this visual 
information, conflict decreases as each one understands where th~y are supposed to be 
fishing. 
An obvious connection between featurelessness and management institutions is 
Ostrom principle #1, having clearly defined boundaries (see Table 2). In most successful 
case studies, boundaries of the community and / or particular user group's CPR needs to 
be clearly defined and understood by all users in order to effectively operate within the 
CPR itself and in order to effectively defend and maintain the CPR against outsider 
encroachment (Ostrom 1990). The featurelessness of the resource also influences 
informal management institutions by often requiring strict monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms (see Table 2, principles #4 and #5) in order to maintain private fishing 
territories (when they exist) and also to effectively socially sanction 'free-riders' who 
access territories that are not their own. 
54 
High Rate of Perishability of Product 
Unlike other natural resource sectors (e.g. most agricultural crops, livestock, and 
timber), most fish and sea creatures are quite perishable once harvested (Acheson 1981). 
As a result, the commercial fishery sector has extensive capital investments in higher-end 
technologies such as refrigeration and dense ice-packing facilities on-shore, and many 
times these facilities exist on the boat itself (Acheson 1981). By contrast, the small-scale 
and artisanal sectors most often do not own or have access to refrigeration, with a few 
utilizing on-shore or small in-raft ice (McGoodwin 2001). With either method, the 
degeneration and loss of fish harvest can be significant (Pollnac 1991, Leap 1977). 
The lack of storage facilities forces artisanal fishers to sell their catch on a daily 
basis at local and regional markets (Noff 1975). This is also one reason why fish harvest 
losses are relatively high compared to agriculture, pastoralism, and forestry. If the harvest 
is not immediately sold or consumed by the artisanal fishers or their families, then it 
quickly becomes commercially worthless. Thus, small-scale and artisanal fishers are 
often in a position of dependency on local and adjacent regional markets. This further 
hinders artisanal fishers from participating in regional, national, and international 
markets. 
3.3.2: Organization of Work I Labor 
Irregular Work Hours 
Since fish stocks are highly unpredictable due to ecological factors such as 
weather and tide shifts, fishers in all types of fisheries are often forced to fish during 'off-
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hours' very early in the morning or overnight while most other people in their 
communities are sleeping (White 1977). This is in contrast to small-scale agriculturalists 
that can often operate on a more set daily schedule since their harvested unit is set in the 
ground and immobile (though weather events can disrupt planting and harvests). 
Artisanal fishers are especially prone to working in the 'off-hours' since their 
rudimentary boats are vulnerable to being water-logged, tipping over, or breaking down 
during high tides. Thus, safety is one reason why artisanal fishers in Huanchaco, Peru 
often fish during the lowest tides occurring overnight (Chapman 2003). In Huanchaco, 
fishers that do go out on the open sea during mid-day at high tide most often go in pairs 
(two reed boats side by side) in order to fish and have a human 'safety net'. Maritime 
artisanal fishers often work during such 'off-hours' overnight because sometimes lower 
tides occur then and because these low tide (calmer water) periods are the most stable and 
productive periods to catch fish (Royce 1987). Working at such odd hours, along with 
residing on often isolated and narrow shorelines geographically separated from the rest of 
the community (a point expanded upon later) have resulted in artisanal fishers being 
social outcasts in many communities (Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981, McGoodwin 1990). 
Sh~fting Residence Patterns 
Another adaptive response to ecological variability is shifting residence patterns 
(Acheson 1981). Periodicity in the availability of desired species and the highly mobile 
and often unpredictable nature of fish migration often forces artisanal fishers to migrate 
with their fish. They might do this by either moving to a family members' or 
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acquaintances' residence nearer the desired catch or even living temporarily on their craft 
(Pollnac 1991). This temporary, seasonal, and sometimes unpredictable shifting of 
residence place and type is a characteristic of many small-scale and artisanal fishers 
(Acheson 1981, McGoodwin 2001), and makes artisanal fishers more comparable to 
pastoralists than agriculturalists (Pollnac 1991). 
Seasonal shifts in residence presents problems for informal management. The 
boundary definitions, inclusiveness, and collective decision-making processes that are 
crucial in maintaining informal management institutions can be w~akened unless properly 
accounted for by the users themselves (McGoodwin 2001). When such shifts are more 
predictable and regularly seasonal in nature, then inclusive collective action is less costly 
as fishers can migrate together or can be contacted regarding management of a certain 
part of the fishery. Ifmigration is not only seasonally predictable, but also geographically 
predictable (i.e., fishers migrate seasonally to the same territories), this further lessens 
costs of management. 
Occupational Pluralism 
Since small-scale and even commercial fishing often bring in relatively small 
incomes, many fishers supplement their meager fishing income with other work, 
engaging in 'occupational pluralism' (Finlayson and McCay 1998). While some find 
work in natural resource extraction jobs (forestry, mining) or other jobs available within 
the community (McGoodwin 2001), such second and third jobs can often require long-
distance migration to urban centers or other manual labor work such-as highway 
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construction. Many fishers do it despite the often heavy costs involved with long-distance 
migration (Acheson 1981). This is a characteristic not necessarily unique to fisheries as 
subsistence agriculturalists and pastoralists, along with forestry employees also engage in 
multiple occupations to supplement meager income from their primary natural resource 
work (Leap 1977). However, it is important to understand this characteristic in the 
specific context of fisheries, especially as it relates to natural resource use pluralism. 
Natural Resource Use / Subsistence Pluralism 
A characteristic of many small-scale and artisanal fishers is not only occupational 
pluralism, but also natural resource use pluralism (Acheson 1981). This is when fishers 
supplement their fishing income by also engaging in small-scale agriculture, animal 
grazing for meat and wool products (pastoralism), gardening, wood gathering, and / or 
hunting (McGoodwin 2001, Leap 1977). Such natural resource use can also be 
considered 'work' and falls under the previous category of 'occupational pluralism' since 
these activities often generate supplemental income. They require the same amount of 
time (if not more) than primary fishing activities and they can sometimes require 
temporary or seasonal residence shifts (Leap 1977). 
Although occupational pluralism is a characteristic among all fishery sectors from 
the commercial to the small-scale, natural resource use pluralism is unique to the small-
scale and artisanal sectors (McGoodwin 200 I). This is often because commercial fishers 
may not have a permanent residence in the community (they tend more to be migrant 
workers or working on a long-distance commercial fishing craft in waters quite distant 
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from their permanent residence) and therefore do not have access to the necessary land 
for supplemental agricultural or grazing activities (McGoodwin 1990). Also, commercial 
crew fishers receive a monetary income and often benefit packages from the vessel owner 
(whether a public or private entity), while small-scale and artisanal fishers tend to rely 
solely on natural resources for subsistence and / or income (Acheson 1981). 
Natural resource use pluralism influences previously mentioned shifting residence 
patterns. Where a maritime artisanal fisher resides during certain periods throughout the 
year often depends on two main factors: how productive nearby cpastal and inland lands 
are in regards to agriculture or grazing and during what times of the year fish catch peaks. 
Thus, if inland land is available and at all conducive to agriculture or grazing, maritime 
artisanal fishers may reside inland in order to farm or graze during part of the year and 
then shift residency to the coast during another season (Pollnac 1991). Coastal land is 
often unproductive agriculturally. This is because of thin shorelines with high and rapid 
inland slopes or coastal deserts too far from distant mountains, both of which hinder 
access to water runoff for irrigation. This creates unique problems for maintaining 
informal management institutions in temporary fishing settlements because many 
fishermen migrate to the coast or around the coast following sought after species without 
their families or children (Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981). 
Historically, artisanal fishers have been social outcasts in many communities 
since they often reside on these isolated and narrow shorelines geographically separate 
from the rest of town while also working in the 'off-hours' (Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981, 
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McGoodwin 1990). In some cases, they are separated from the rest of the community by 
both space and time. 
The major factor affecting local informal management concerning occupational 
and natural resource use pluralism is time spent by users on these supplementary 
activities. Often with occupational pluralism, a local fisher leaves the community and 
their residence for a stretch of time of weeks to months for another wage labor job. 
Depending on how staggered local fishers are in their respective time spent outside their 
communities relative to each other performing wage labor can adversely affect Ostrom's 
principles #3, #4, and #5 (see Table 2). If there is a set season or fishing 'off-season' time 
period where it is known throughout the user group that many local small-scale fishers 
will be leaving the community for supplemental work or spending more time and energy 
tending to other natural resource work while maintaining their residence, then this is 
more annually predictable and management institutions are more likely to be adjusted 
accordingly to account for seasonal loss of fishers. However, if such supplemental work 
is staggered across the user group inconsistently, then a local fisher could experience less 
access to collective-choice arrangements (such as status within the group or access to 
voting or decision-making procedures). Also, if a local fisher leaves for supplemental 
work that serves as a monitor or a locally respected official that is crucial in deciding and 
administering sanctions, their access to such a position within an informal management 
structure can be jeopardized. 
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3.4: Goals of the Paper 
Chapter I introduced the importance of third world small-scale fisheries and 
outlined the problems of these fisheries and how the research questions relate to those. 
Chapter II reviewed the CPR management literature that explains how and what type of 
informal institutions small-scale communities devise in order to manage a CPR. Chapter 
III elaborated on the emerging problems facing small-scale fisheries and analyzed unique 
challenges narrowing the discussion of CPR management down to small-scale and 
artisanal fishery management. The next chapter presents seven case studies of small-scale 
and artisanal fishing communities across the Latin American region taken from 
previously published books and journal articles. Chapter V concludes with a synthesized 
analysis of the case studies concerning the research questions. As originally presented in 
chapter 1, my two research questions are: 
1. Do the often cited Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996) models for 
informal CPR management hold up in the case of Latin American fisheries? 
2. What factors increase the resilience of local management systems in the face 
of pressures from commercial encroachment in Latin American small-scale 
fisheries? 
The continued viability of informal fisheries management institutions in many 
Latin American fishing communities are being threatened by outsider encroachment. 
Thus, it is crucial to properly understand what principles promote effective management 
and healthy CPRs (research question #1) and under what conditions these principles 
continue to exist despite external threats (research question #2). 
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CHAPTER IV 
LA TIN AMERICAN ARTISANAL CASE STUDIES 
This chapter outlines seven case studies from Latin American artisanal fishing 
communities. Section 4.1 outlines three criteria most often used to classify artisanal 
fisheries as being a 'success' or 'failure'. Section 4.2 provides descriptions of relevant 
factors within each separate case study that have been previously defined and outlined. 
Most of the data, being qualitative / ethnographically descriptive in nature and extracted 
from the case studies, is included there. 
4.1: Defining Success and Failure 
In order to answer my first research question, I need to determine whether local 
management systems 'work' or not in the context of Latin American artisanal fisheries. 
To do this, I will first establish a set of criteria to distinguish between 'successful' and 
'failed' artisanal fisheries. Much of the CPR management case study literature is 
concerned with preparing policy recommendations for furthering effective natural 
resource management practices. As a result, a majority of cases are defined at some point 
as either 'succeeding' or 'failing' by various criteria determined either by the author, 
previous researchers, or the local CPR users themselves. 
However, there is little clear consensus about how to define success and failure of 
a CPR. Numerous criteria ranging from formalized clusters of variables to more informal 
observations of a few variables have been utilized. However, there are some regularities 
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among criteria that can be categorized. Three general categories that often serve as 
criteria for determining success and failure are: environmental/ecosystem health, 
economic performance, and social stability. Applying these criteria to artisanal fisheries, 
success would be determined by: 
• Environmental Health: fish stock, species renewal, levels of 
ecosystem degradation, levels of catch and production 
• Economic Performance: resource unit output, prices, income 
levels 
• Social Stability: community isolation, cohesion, factioning, 
splintering, inequality 
Such measures provide a starting point to determine success and failure in a 
fishery. In the case studies analyzed in this paper, these three criteria are sometimes 
mentioned in passing and not necessarily supplemented with quantified data. Even in 
such cases, the level of environmental, economic, and social health can be determined as 
relatively a 'success' or 'failure' since most of the case study literature on artisanal 
fishery failure paints a picture of those variables being in such dire conditions that 
determining success relative to such deteriorating conditions can be achieved. Thus, the 
case study literature on artisanal fisheries has tended to show success and failure on the 
edges of a spectrum, with ecological and social systems either working quite smoothly or 
nearing complete collapse. 
For the first research question, success and failure will be determined by those 
three criteria. I will then examine the existence of the ideal types of CPR management 
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principles to test if they are effective and are present in the 'successful' cases and absent 
in the 'failed' cases. For the second research question concerning resilient management, 
success and failure (resilient or not) will be determined by the continued existence of 
traditional management institutions during and / or after periods of external threat. In all 
of these case studies, commercial and other outsider 'on the water' fishing encroachment 
is the primary threat to local management systems. 'Resilient' management will be 
determined by the continued existence and functioning of traditional management 
institutions among locals faced with such encroachment. 
There is variation across the case studies on who determines 'success' and 
'failure' along these criteria. In most of the cases, the authors present these criteria and 
often forward their own evaluation on whether the fishery and fishers are 'succeeding' or 
'failing'. However, in some cases the author(s) determine success or failure based on 
previous research performed by other fieldworkers in the same communities, or the 
author(s) proclaim success or failure based on interviews or sample surveys oflocal 
artisanal fishers. Thus, there are three main groups that are determining success or 
failure: the author(s), previous researchers, and the local artisanal fishers. As I elaborate 
on each case study briefly in the next section, I will distinguish how these criteria have 
been measured and who is making the determination. 
4.2: Case Study Descriptions 
I use seven case studies from the Latin American region drawn from previously 
published literature in order to answer my two research questions. Table 7 provides 
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references, a basic summary of the setting for each case study, and brief notes on results 
concerning the two research questions. Five are located in Brazil, one in Peru, and one in 
Belize. Four are maritime fisheries, two are riverine (Brazilian Amazon), and one is an 
enclosed lake (Lake Titicaca, Peru). Five are almost completely artisanal (consisting of 
non-motorized, beachlanding, owner-operated fishing fleets) and the other two are small-
scale (at least a quarter of the boats are motorized, but almost all exhibit the two 
characteristics of small-scale). Two of the seven case studies are longitudinal with 
analysis of community and management system dynamics dating )Jack at least a few 
decades. The five non-longitudinal studies are more grounded in the 'ethnographic 
present' and systems are analyzed as resilient, successful, and so forth at the time of data 
collection (spanning over months) without accounting for long-term historical 
trajectories. All seven communities and regions have experienced moderate to severe 
outsider fishing encroachment. These experiences with outsider encroachment range from 
commercial sector fishing fleets moving in and fishing in what have traditionally been 
territories fished by local community fishers to state-owned fleets and even recreational 
fishers exploiting traditional territories and nearby waters. 
Six of the seven have been defined by their respective authors as 'successful' by 
the set of three criteria listed in section 4.1. In some cases, the fishers themselves have 
been interviewed and have echoed the author's interpretation or provided such an 
interpretation for the author. 
Table 7. Brief Summary of Latin American Case Studies. 
Location / Source 
Bahia, Brazil 






















- #9 inconclusive 
8 present 
- lacks #6 (may 
exist, perhaps 
not resilient) 
- #9 inconclusive 
6 present 
- lacks: #2, #4, 
#10 
- #9 inconclusive 
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Resilient Management 




- High reciprocity 
- Robust shoreline 
activities 
-' Shift to nearby lakes 
during rainy season, 
commercial 
encroachment on rivers 
- High reciprocity 
- Informal mgmt. 
institution breakdown 
- Relatively less 
reciprocity and 
shoreline activities 
- Costs of maintaining 
traditional mgmt. 
outweigh benefits 
- High influxes of 
outside capital and 
technology 
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Table 7. Brief Summary of Latin American Case Studies (continued) 






Lake Titicaca, Enclosed lake 
Peru Artisanal 
Levieil and Orlove 
(1990) 
Orlove (2002) 
Rio De Janiero 












Model Principles Resilient Management 
9 present - Defense of in-shore 
- #9 inconclusive territories from 
commercial 
encroachment 
- High reciprocity 
- Robust shoreline 
activities 
9 present -'Defense of communal 




- lacks: #3, #4, 
#5,#6,#10 
- #9 inconclusive 
- High reciprocity (inter 
and intra community 
exchange) 
- Robust shoreline 
activities (totora reed 
collection) 




- High reciprocity 
(information exchange) 
- Unsuccessful fishery 
- Few effective mgmt. 
institutions 
67 
The rest of this section provides a profile of the seven case studies. While these 
represent a good portion of Latin American artisanal fishery cases documented in the past 
three decades, this is not an exhaustive list. These seven were picked mainly because they 
fit the 'type' criteria for this analysis (small-scale and I or artisanal, informal management 
with an absence of state management institutions) and discussed (whether at length or 
briefly) the model principles and resiliency factors to be tested in each of the two 
research questions. For a thorough listing of these and other fishery case studies in Latin 
America (from journal articles to dissertations), along with an exhaustive bibliography 
spanning all sectors of CPRs across world regions and citations of early theory works in 
the CPR management literature, see Fenton Martin's Common Pool Resources and 
Collective Action: A Bibliography (1989). 
Bahia State, Brazil- Cordell (1984, 1992 with McKean) 
John Cordell is the primary author of the two chapters cited for this case (the 
latter co-authored with Margaret McKean) and the data were collected through various 
periods through the 1970s, as early as 1973. Fourteen rural maritime artisanal fishing 
communities on the southern coast of Bahia state in northeastern Brazil are analyzed in 
this case study. Only a handful oflocal fishers operate small-scale motorized craft. The 
vast majority are artisanals that build dugout wood canoes, some with sails attached to 
harness prevailing winds to maneuver through these swampy tropical coastal waters. 
Bahia fishers are called 'beirados' (,shore-dwellers') because of their focus on exploiting 
in-shore waters that are characterized by lots of swampy mangroves; coral reefs, and tiny 
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'caye' islands. It is these sorts of 'messy' ecological features of this northern Brazilian 
coastline that used to keep inland populations away from fishing this region until 
descendants from black plantation laborers inland moved to this area as a means for 
subsistence. Most of the current beirado and community population are descendants of 
these inland black plantation laborers. Beirados use their catch for both subsistence and 
for income from sale in local and regional markets. Some beirados have established 
connections with 'middle-men' who transport and market their harvest in nearby regional 
markets. Over 200 different species of fish and shellfish are harve$ted. A beirados' catch 
must be stored, sold, or transported quickly once landed as ice is not brought on craft as it 
hinders the maneuverability of the wooden canoes, even the few motorized ones. 
Beirados use a mix of individual and communal forms of property rights on the 
coastal waters of these communities. The often sheltered nature of this specific coastline 
with the cayes, mangroves, and coral reefs allow for easier visual triangulation methods 
in marking individual fishing territories relative to other maritime coastlines lacking such 
ecological features. These territories exist mostly on the 'in-shore' waters that are defined 
as out to 50 meters from the shore. Individual territories range from 400 to 600 square 
kilometers in size. Individual and communal territories are shifted seasonally in a 
complex system in order to follow fish that migrate along the coast according to cycles of 
the moon that influence tide shifts (see Cordell 1974). Since much of the potential catch 
moves with these tides, the beirados do the same, moving their territories on a seasonal 
basis to maintain their livelihood through the year. Six factors are used by 'mestres' 
('canoe bosses') who are the experienced and respected beirado leaders in order to 
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detennine where territories are to be established during each season: current shifts, tide-
level shifts, lighting conditions corresponding with various moon phases, interactions of 
wind and current, slope of the sea bottom, and sea bottom conditions. 
Brazil's national Ministry of Fisheries, 'Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento de 
Pesca' (SUDEPE), maintain that all of Brazil 's coastal waters are public property under 
national law. Although this technically and legally means that Bahia coastal waters are 
under pure open-access conditions, this has not been the way it has played out in reality 
since the beirados have instituted their own infonnal management-system. Low budget 
allocations to the fisheries ministry has hindered any state management or monitoring 
mechanisms along any of Brazil's coast, especially in the rural and swampy northeastern 
Bahia. 
Commercial fleet encroachment is becoming a problem as the number of high-
tech fleets trawling the off-shore waters along the entire Brazilian coastline (including 
Bahia) are increasing. This encroachment increased sharply in the early 1970s when 
SUDEPE began implementing national policies designed to increase economic incentives 
for current and potential commercial entrepreneurs and investors. During this period, 
SUDEPE passed three laws influencing the ability of commercial fleets to operate with 
increased flexibility. These were: tax exemptions on up to 75 percent of personal income 
from fishing, suspensions of import tariffs on advanced fishing technology and craft, and 
selective suspensions of federal taxes on catch being shipped to luxury internal and 
certain export markets. These factors at the macro level subsidize capital investment by 
commercial fleets and increase their ability to encroach upon small-scale communities 
along the Bahia coastline. 
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Beirados land about 70 percent of the total fish catch along the southern half of 
Bahia state. This production level has remained steady and is evidence of environmental 
success and lack of over-exploitation. Despite this large contribution of the beirados' 
harvest to the local and regional cuisine, there have historically been economic hardships 
and a persistence of widespread poverty in this tropical coastal region. This is due mainly 
to low prices for species harvested. However, while local market prices may remain low 
enough to keep most of the artisanals in more of a subsistence mode, these incomes have 
remained rather stable along with total catch. Socially, beirados exhibit a high rate of 
reciprocal exchange as observed by Cordell. The author has deemed this case study an 
ecological and social success. 
In Bahia, in-shore waters are easier to defend by artisanals, since their technology 
is more suited for shallower in-shore exploitation. Beirados have successfully defended 
their in-shore territories and maintained their informal management system. Cordell 
emphasizes how reciprocity and cooperation are high in Bahia, especially concerning 
shoreline activities. 
Baixo Region, Brazil- McGrath et. al. (1993) 
Thirteen rural communities along the Amazon floodplain (known as the 'varzea') 
of the 'Baixo' region of the Brazilian Amazon are analyzed in this case study. The Baixo 
is the varzea region that stretches from its western border at the convergence of Para and 
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Amazonas states east to the mouth of the Xingu River. Local fishers are riverine artisanal. 
The year is split into two main seasons by weather conditions, the rainy and dry seasons. 
In the rainy season, the varzea rivers overflow and most of the floodplain region is 
inundated with water up to the tree-tops. There is such an extreme increase in standing 
water that water craft can travel for tens of kilometers north to south beyond the normal 
dry season boundaries of the rivers without even touching dry land. This rainy season 
creates a major ecological feature of the varzea, lakes that are otherwise small standing 
pools during the dry season that range in size from a few thousand square meters to 
several hundred square kilometers. These lakes are numerous during the rainy season and 
hold a large amount of fish that migrate from the connected rivers for the plankton that 
develops as a thick coat on the lakes' surface. 
Artisanals use fish both for subsistence and for income from sale in local and 
regional markets. Lacking ice and refrigeration, artisanals have traditionally used salt to 
dry store their catch. This dry salted fish has been the trademark of the fish sold in the 
region. Many travelers (rubber trappers and traders) boating through the region have 
stopped and bought this salted fish. Their fish has also been a main portion of the diet for 
the urban poor of Belem, the nearest urban area in Para state. 
Artisanals are natural resource use pluralists engaging in a rotation of fishing, 
small-scale agriculture, and pastoralism. Traditionally and up through the early 1970s, 
these three activities were rotated and labor time and energy was near equally split 
between them. A decline in the value of jute (the main agricultural crop) has been 
attributed to the introduction of synthetic fibers to Brazil and has influenced the shift 
towards more artisanal fishing labor. 
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Communal property rights exist in the varzea lakes, no individual territories exist. 
Communal territories are based on the location of a community relative to the lake and 
the lake is divided fairly evenly between the communities surrounding a lake. Artisanal 
fishers informally manage these floodwater lakes during the rainy season. The varzeiros 
view the lake as theirs in the community sense, while the rivers are more perceived as 
open-access and are not under informal management control. Access to the lakes is 
therefore limited to those collectively recognized as local community fishers. Certain 
technologies, such as gillnets and other new technology inputs, are restricted collectively, 
especially when lake waters begin to recede heading into the dry season. Motors are 
collectively restricted on the lakes. Ice is also prohibited, which restricts the amount one 
fisher can catch since they have to take the time and energy to salt the fish instead. These 
are informal management techniques by the varzeiros to prevent over-exploitation during 
the 'lean' season allowing for less seasonal variation in actual and potential harvest. 
Commercial encroachment appeared in the early 1970s and has steadily increased 
since then. Two major factors influenced the rise of commercial encroachment in the 
Baixo, post-1950s technology increases of the Brazilian commercial fleets that allowed 
for traveling of greater distances and longer trips from port, and a sharp increase in urban 
food demand with the hyper-urbanization of the 1970s across Latin America. With 
commercial fleets entering the varzea rivers, varzeiro artisanal fishing has been declining 
in productivity. Traditionally, varzeiros fished more during the beginnings of the dry 
season in August and September when the two most sought after species, characins and 
catfish, migrated upstream in the rivers. However, with commercial fleets focusing on 
these species during this time, the catfish especially is the biggest portion of the Baixo 
commercial export market, artisanals are turning more to the lakes in order to maintain 
production levels. 
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This case study is successful according to the three criteria. Environmentally, 
varzeiros have maintained their fish catch by shifting from river to lake exploitation as 
discussed earlier in the face of commercial encroachment. Economically, varzeiros 
continue to use their fish catch for both subsistence and income at stable levels. Socially, 
varzeiros have found a new sense of collective identity in recent decades since the rise of 
commercial encroachment. The urban commercial fleet outsiders that have encroached 
along the riverbanks of the Baixo communities have served as a reinforcement of 
varzeiro collective identity since they have had to shift to lake fishing and build informal 
management institutions appropriate to those resources while also attempting to defend 
their local communities against further takeover by commercial enterprises. 
Caye Caulker, Belize - King (2000), Sutherland (1986) 
Data for this case study spans from the 1960s up to 1997 and is represented by 
Anne Sutherland's book (1986) that provides data up to 1986 and Thomas D. King's 
follow-up study (2000), which provides data through 1997. 
Caye Caulker is a small island northeast of Belize City off the Atlantic coast of 
mainland Belize. Caye Caulker is 5 miles from north to south and only half a mile wide at 
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its widest point. Such small islands that dot the coast of Belize and other Latin American 
nations are often referred to as 'cayes'. There are numerous neighboring cayes to Caulker 
of similar size such as Caye Chapel 200 miles south. Caye Caulker is also the name of the 
one community on this particular island that is home to about 1,000 residents as of 1997. 
The popUlation has more than doubled since the 1980 census that showed 413 residents. 
The village itself is nestled on the east side of the caye stretching one mile north to south 
and only three blocks east to west. The village is this small because most of the caye 
consists of swampy mangrove areas that are too marshy for building stable houses. The 
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nearest urban center is Belize City twenty miles to the southeast of the village, but 
separated by about] 0 miles of ocean between the caye and mainland Belize. Commercial 
and small-scale owner I operator ferry craft provide transportation from mainland to the 
caye multiple times daily. 
Caye Caulker fishers are almost all small-scale maritime fishers since they have 
motorized craft. Traditional fishers are the descendants of the original inhabitants of Caye 
Caulker, refugees from the War of Castes who migrated to the caye from the Yucatan 
region of Mexico just north of Belize around] 848. Almost all Caye Caulker residents, 
including fishers, are multi-lingual fluent in both English and Spanish. Small-scale 
fishers focus mostly on lobster utilizing trapezoid-shaped traps fabricated from wood 
about four feet long by one-and-a-half feet wide. 
Caye Caulker fishers have been organized in a cooperative since 1960, the 
Northern Fishermen Cooperative Society (NFCS). Although this cooperative does what is 
outlined in chapter II concerning pooling of capital and attempting to. control external 
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markets through setting production levels and such, the organization also acts as a 
meeting place for the fishers who also informally manage their resource. NFCS meetings 
are a venue where some of the informal decisions concerning fishing are made and 
informal management institutions are created and discussed. Since all the fishers that are 
a part of the cooperative also participate in informal management, collective action 
management generally occurs within the context of a cooperative meeting. A local fisher 
has to be in one to be a part of the other. To be legitimized as a local fisher is to be a 
cooperative member. 
A mix of individual and communal property rights existed up to 1986 when 
individual territories completely saturated all of the accessible coastal waters. Visual 
triangulation methods are used to determine individually held territories. Many fishers 
have multiple territories recognized as their own and have room to place anywhere from 
40 to 100 lobster traps at one time in each territory. Access is regulated through 
cooperative registration and most fishers act as monitors for spotting any outsiders that 
are not supposed to be accessing their territories. 
There are numerous characteristics unique to the Caye Caulker case study 
compared with the other six cases. Having access to lobster has allowed fishers to reap 
the rewards of extraordinarily high demand beyond local and regional markets. Fishers 
process and export to the first world and with their strong cooperative membership and 
participation, have effectively maintained strong economic linkages through these 
external markets. These high financial returns have allowed the purchase of numerous 
technological inputs besides storage and processing facilities, including extra fuel for 
craft and ice for plant or residence storage. However, there is increasing evidence of 
economic stratification as certain fishers are accumulating upwards of 1,500 to 2,000 
lobster traps that they now import instead of fabricate. Other forms of technology are 
being accumulated at a rapid rate by a small number of fishers. 
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The NFCS built a small processing plant for fishers' use to store, process, 
package, and export their spiny lobster catch as a group without having to establish 
connections with 'middle-men'. The NFCS was able to build this facility since they have 
received increasingly high returns on the highly sought-after lobster species they mostly 
sell to the first world. A private entrepreneur from the U.S. even invested in the building 
of this facility. Caye Caulker is in a position of having access to a unique and valuable 
species in demand by first world consumers. 
Commercial fleet encroachment has not occurred at Caye Caulker as it has in 
most of the other case studies. However, outsider encroachment in the form of private 
wealthy individuals with linkages to regional and global lobster markets is occurring as 
they are increasingly purchasing the traditional territories of small-scale fishers. This is 
not 'on the water' encroachment initially and does seem to produce less conflict since 
transactions occur between private individuals. However, this outsider encroachment is 
similar to commercial fleet encroachment in that 'on the water' conflict between outsider 
fishers or fleets and traditional fishers can eventually occur when these outsider investors 
employ or contract out to commercial fleets to harvest the lobster. Sometimes, the 
investor has contracted through an individual that registers with the cooperative, acquires 
similar technology, and fishes using traditional methods. In other cases, the investor is 
actually an experienced fisher from another area who performs the work himself. 
Whichever of these scenarios, outsider encroachment has increased as the market for 
spiny lobster has grown. 
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Caye Caulker has developed CPR management institutions that have historically 
protected all three indicators of success. Environmentally, production levels have been 
stable over three decades from 1964 to 1997. There are no significant signs of over-
exploitation. Economically, Caye Caulker is the biggest success story among all seven 
case studies with respect to price levels and economic linkages. N of 1997, lobster prices 
were ranging from $12 to $15 (U.S.) per pound. Socially, high levels of intra-fisher and 
community solidarity exist. However, while this case study supports some of the effective 
model principles, management has not been resilient within the last decade and has begun 
to breakdown from outsider encroachment. Specific reasons for this are elaborated on in 
chapter V, section 5.2. 
Coqueira/, Brazil- Forman (1970) 
Shepard Forman authored the book cited for this case study. In 1965, Forman 
lived in the small rural community of Coqueiral and collected the data for his 
ethnography. Coqueiral is located on the Atlantic coast in Alagoas state of northeastern 
Brazil. Coqueiral has approximately 852 residents with about 85 of those being active 
maritime artisanal fishers. None of the fishers' crafts are motorized, so they are all 
considered artisanal. Fishing is the primary economic activity of Coqueiral. Artisanals 
use hook and line technology from the 'janganda' rafts they build from locally gathered 
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materials such as light balsa wood ('piuba') and vegetable fibers. Some artisanals attach 
sails to their janganda craft to harness prevailing off-shore winds. Artisanal fishers are 
called 'jangadieros' (,raft fishermen') locally after their rudimentary wooden craft. 
Jangadieros use their catch both for subsistence and for income from sales in local and 
regional markets. They often have connections with 'middle-men' known locally as 'fish-
hawkers' (Forman counted 12 in Coqueiral) who will transport and market their catch in 
adjacent markets. 
Jangadieros use a mix of individual and communal properJ:y rights. Individual 
fishing territories are marked by visual triangulation methods. Jangadieros line up 
community markers on-shore and then use depth perception along with 'hand-marking' 
(using hand-length to determine distances visually between two markers on-shore) to 
measure how far out from shore they are. Whenjangadieros lose sight of visual markers, 
often around 50 meters out, they count time corrected for prevailing winds while 
journeying beyond sight of the shoreline. When they feel they have reached their specific 
territory, they will drop a plumb line to touch the ocean bottom and bring it back up for a 
smell test. Rocky bottoms smell sweet, gravel has a distinct 'bad odor', and muddy 
bottoms smell more foul. Since each jangadiero intimately knows his particular territory 
and the composition of its bottom, this method has historically worked well. 
These individual territories exist in a grid system along the coastal stretch of 
Coqueiral. They are partitioned taking into account the two main factors the jangadieros 
consider as affecting productivity of a fishing spot: depth and ocean bottom composition. 
Each of these territories is named after the two visual markers used to triangulate its 
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location. Jangadieros distinguish between individual spots, communal territories, and 
'lisos' which are unproductive territories that no one fishes in because of their plain level 
and sandy ocean bottoms. Both individual and communal territories reach out to 100 
meters off-shore where the edge of the continental shelf is and ocean depth drops 
substantially and rapidly. Jangadieros distinctly divide the ocean waters between these 
two categories of in and off shore waters. Beyond the continental shelf and into the 'off-
shore' deeper ocean waters, jangadieros say that this part of the ocean is evil and filled 
with 'sea monsters'. A jangadiero is 'tempting the devil' ifhe attempts to travel beyond 
the in-shore waters beyond 100 meters. 
Local residents have notices commercial fleets trawling along the 100 meter mark 
in the years prior to and during the 1965 field study. Various types of fleets in this region 
include larger motorized boats with seiners or longer nets than the jangadieros'. These 
fleets have been trawling along and entering the territories of jangadieros. 
Coqueiral is portrayed as a success along the three criteria, especially concerning 
social criteria. Environmentally, there is no evidence of over-exploitation as production 
levels have remained stable over seven months of Forman's fieldwork. Economically, 
income from fish production is steady. Socially, jangadieros show a high amount of 
reciprocity including shoreline work activities and 'hanging out' that occurs daily both 
intra and inter family. In addition, there is a high amount of inter-generational transfer of 
traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) concerning mostly species migration and 
weather patterns and information about traditional individual property rights. 
Janganda craft are easily water-logged because the piuba they are made of is 
extremely light and porous, piuba wood often weighs less than a similar sized piece of 
cork. Such rudimentary technologies need repair often. Thus, shoreline activities are 
robust at Coqueiral, a group of jangadieros can be seen daily either repairing their 
jangadas or nets along the shoreline or when technology is not in need of repair, simply 
'hanging out' engaged in idle conversation. This is where inter-family networks of 
reciprocal exchange form and are reinforced. Generally, there is high reciprocity within 
and between families in Coqueiral. Food and crafts are the two most often exchanged 
items 'leaving little need for money' in the community. 
Lake Titicaca, Peru - Levieil and Orlave (1990), Orlave (2002) 
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This case study is represented by a book authored by Benjamin S. Orlove and one 
article co-authored by Dominique P. Levieil and Orlove. Their work studies 151 artisanal 
and small-scale fishing communities that surround the highest elevated enclosed lake in 
the world, Lake Titicaca, Peru between 1976 to 1984. These are all rural communities as 
they do not include the urban lakeshore city of Puno, the nearest urban area and market. 
This is the only 'lake' case study included in my analysis. All 151 communities are on 
the Peruvian side of the lake (Lake Titicaca crosses the Peru-Bolivia national border) and 
average 20 artisanal fishers per community. Over 95 percent of all local community 
fishers on the lake are non-motorized artisanal fishers. Half of these artisanals use wood 
craft and the other half used reed-sewn 'balsa' rafts the materials for which are gathered 
from reed beds that exist adjacent to each community's informal fishing territory along 
the shoreline. 
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Artisanal fishing is done overnight, with most nets being retrieved in the early 
morning hours around dawn. One-sixth of the total catch is used for subsistence and 
most, two-thirds, is sold for cash in local and regional markets. Artisanals are natural 
resource use pluralists engaging in small-scale agriculture on individually held plots and 
pastoralism on communally held grazing pastures in and surrounding their respective 
communities. They are also occupational pluralists working in such income-generating 
activities as handicraft production and migratory wage labor available in the high lake 
region. Although fishing takes 33 percent of an artisanal's labor time on average, it 
generates 50 to 75 percent of an artisanal 's household income. This is why fishing is seen 
as the primary work by artisanals in the region and other natural resource work and wage 
occupations are viewed as supplemental income. Fish species harvested include the 
endemic 'Orestia', accounting for 67 percent of total annual catch, and introduced non-
native species (including rainbow trout and silverside) account for 15 percent of the 
harvest weight. 
Each community exercises informal common-property rights over one fishing 
territory. That is, there are at least 151 different fishing territories that fit under the 
'communal' definition of type of property rights (see Table 1). Each lakeshore 
community has a specifically defined rectangular territory of aquatic space based on 
visual triangulation. The width of the lakeshore community determines the width 
boundaries and the length out into the middle of the lake for each territory depends on 
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factors such as lake bottom depth, slope level, and species available at these certain 
depths. Each community informally recognizes neighboring communities' rights to their 
respective communal territories. With communal property rights, all fishers in a 
community have access to the entire community rectangular territory rather than 
individual fishers maintaining separate individual fishing spots. This communal form of 
property rights seems to have been an adaptation to the lake's fish species that show high 
variability in migration and size both seasonally and annually. Communal rights allow 
fishers to exploit a larger territory to respond to such variability rather than maintaining 
much smaller individual spots. 
The Peruvian national government claims formal/legal rights to the entire waters 
of the lake, including the territories informally marked by local artisanals. Registration of 
all fishers, regardless of sector, is the responsibility of the national Ministry of Fisheries 
according to written law. Enforcement of national rights is the responsibility of the Coast 
Guard, but low budgets have hindered such registration and enforcement practices from 
their full effective potential. 
Still, the Coast Guard does patrol the lake occasionally and it is this, along with 
inland 'lakeshore community outsiders' that has encroached on traditional fishing 
territories. The high proportionate income seen by local fishers and the impoverished 
subsistence conditions of the nearby inland Andean peoples have influenced community 
outsiders to attempt to fish on informally allocated fishing territories. The Coast Guard 
has occasionally entered the communal territories of certain communities and confiscated 
nets from artisanals who are accused of excluding outsiders from attempting to fish in the 
lake. Since the entire lake is formally under the jurisdiction of the Peruvian state, the 
Coast Guard officially has the authority to encroach on local management institutions 
without fear oflegal challenge. 
This case study is deemed a success by the authors on numerous occasions. 
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Studies prior to the 1990 article (Levieil 1986, Levieil 1987) up to Orlove's 2002 
synthesis have noted stable fish harvest levels and no signs of environmental over-
exploitation. Economically, the previously mentioned focus on fishing as accounting for 
half to three-quarters of an artisanal 's household income has beeILstable across the study 
period, fishing has been perceived for years as the main income generator for the region's 
artisanals. Numerous surveys and interviews reveal high levels of reciprocity and 
cooperation between fishers and the fishing communities. Thus, the authors deem this 
case study a success based largely on the social data gathered from the fishers 
themselves. 
It is crucial to note that this is the only case study that explicitly cites one ofthe 
two CPR models I have used in my analysis. Orlove (2002) cites Ostrom's (1990) model 
as an excellent synthesis of principles found in successful informal CPR management 
systems and claims that the Lake Titicaca communities support Ostrom's entire model. 
At Lake Titicaca, successful resilient management has been confirmed by 
government and researcher censuses of local artisanal fishers. Resiliency has been 
achieved through adaptive responses of collective verbal and physical interference and 
destruction or theft of outsiders' nets. High reciprocity is present and has been influenced 
by high homogeneity and endogamy in lakeshore communities (50 percent of marriages 
are intra-community). There is high inter-community reciprocity as there are frequent 
accounts in surveys and interviews of informal reciprocal exchanges occurring between 
adjacent community fishers that wish to fish on another community's territory. These 
exchanges take various forms from exchanging agricultural products, portions of fish 
catch, or buying another fisher a beer. A key shoreline activity for Lake Titicaca 
artisanals is totora reed collection. 
Rio de Janiero and Sao Paulo States, Brazil- Begossi (1998,2001) 
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Small-scale maritime fishers of the Atlantic Forest coast in southern Brazil are 
analyzed in these two book chapters authored by Alpina Begossi. The data was collected 
through various periods in the early and mid-1990s. The study included eight small 
adjacent rural communities that lie on the Atlantic coastline between the two nearest 
urban centers, Rio de Janiero to the north and Sao Paulo to the south. These eight 
communities are deemed 'small' by the author since they have a range from only 26 to 
100 families residing in each. Residents share common cultural roots (the population is 
referred to as 'Caicaras', native Indian descendants with some mestizo from mixing with 
Portuguese) and the cultural homogeneity of this case study is high. Houses in each 
community are geographically arranged according to the oldest male's residence. Thus, 
nuclear families live in separate houses adjacent to the 'father' or 'grandfather'. 
Caicaras fishers build wood canoes, use encircling or gill nets, and also various 
types of hook and line methods. Some are artisanal and use paddles and some are small-
scale and have motors attached. Caicaras have traditionally been natural resource use 
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pluralists shifting between two activities: agriculture and fishing, both of which provide 
for subsistence as well as income from sales to local and regional markets. On average, 
90 percent of fish catch is sold for income and the other 10 percent is used for 
subsistence. Caicaras fishers often use 'middle-men' to transport and sell their catch to 
larger communities in the region. Small-scale agriculture here includes four main crops: 
manioc, potatoes, yams, and beans. Agriculture was the primary work activity until the 
1950s when the Caicaras began shifting to fishing since the market price dropped for 
manioc, their main crop. Since then, fishing has become the main source of income for 
Caicaras and takes up a majority of their labor time and energy. Two other factors 
influenced this shift away from agriculture. First, there is a decreasing amount of land 
available since federal and state designated conservation areas are growing along the 
Atlantic rainforest. Second, further conflict has erupted between the Ministry of the 
Environment and the Caicaras concerning the state's conservation regulations on land 
and the Caicaras traditional practice of slash and bum agricultural techniques. 
Fish is the main source of protein for Caicaras, constituting over half of their 
annual animal consumption. A wide variety of fish are harvested including bluefish, 
squid, halfbeak, mullets, sand drum, snook, and catfish. A total of 115 species are 
identified by folk name, which correspond to 105 biologically separate species. 
The Caicaras' property rights system is a mixture of individual and communal. 
There are some specific fishing territories informally recognized as spots belonging to 
certain individuals or families. Besides those spots, territories are based on community 
location with community fishers having rights to that specific communal territory. 
Commercial encroachment from industrial fishing fleets trawling along the off-
shore coastal waters has been increasing in the last decade. Sepetiba Bay off the shore 
from the community of Itacuruca is experiencing the most intense commercial fleet 
encroachment. 
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Caicaras fisheries are deemed a success by the author. Fish stock abundance and 
catch amounts have been stable throughout the study periods. While the prices of 
agricultural crops such as manioc have fluctuated widely, the income generated from 
fishing has remained relatively stable, as have amounts of catch Slvailable for subsistence. 
Socially, fishers exhibit a high rate of information sharing across various topics from 
locations of certain species to weather warnings. 
There is successful resilient management to commercial fleet encroachment in 
this case. Caicaras' adaptive response is 'marking their spot' by constantly being out on 
the waters fishing their individual, family, and communal territories to physically resist 
in-shore encroachment. They define their in-shore waters by 'marking their spot'. 
Caicaras exhibit high reciprocity with high rates of information exchange between 
fishers. 
Rio Grande River, Brazil- Castro and Begossi (1995,1996) 
Two journal articles, both authored by Fabio de Castro and Alpina Begossi, with 
data collected over a one year span from March 1988 to February 1989, represent this 
case study. The authors collected data through formal and informal interviews, survey 
questionnaires, and participant observation while on artisanal craft-during 'on the water' 
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fishing labor. Two rural communities, Icem and Frontiera, on the Rio Grande in Brazil 
are analyzed in this case study. About 41 riverine artisanal fishers exist in these two 
communities bordering two states, Icem on the Sao Paulo state side and Frontiera on the 
Minas Gareis side. Icem's population was measured at about 6,500. With only 41 fishers, 
fishing is not a major part of the local economy and has decreased in importance over 20 
years. Local fishers say that many fellow artisanals outmigrated between the 1970s and 
1980s. The construction and opening of a hydroelectric plant upstream in the community 
of Marimbondo in 1974 has reduced the quality and economic importance of fishing in 
surrounding communities by enticing local fishers to work in the plant. Only three of the 
41 fishers still around operate motorized craft, the rest are considered artisanal and build 
aluminum canoes. There are three main technologies used for harvesting: gill nets, cast 
nets, and longlines. Artisanals use their catch for both subsistence and for income by 
selling in local markets. 
There are two annual seasons determined by weather patterns at Rio Grande, the 
wet 'cheia' season from November to March and the dry 'seca' season from May to 
September (April and October considered a third category of ecological conditions, 
transition months). Fish stocks are much more abundant in the wet season as productivity 
rises sharply and amount of catch per unit of fishing effort increases during these months. 
Total fish catch by artisanals drops to only 7 percent in the dry season of what is caught 
in the wet season. Dry season income from fish harvest is only 10 percent of what it is in 
the wet season. Thus, seasonality is both extreme and quite predictable on Rio Grande. 
Fishing work is performed almost exclusively by artisanals during the abundant 'cheia' 
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wet season. However, lcem and Frontiera artisanals are both natural resource use and 
occupational pluralists during the 'seca' dry season. Roughly 60 percent of artisanals 
engage in one or more of the following during the dry half of the year: small-scale 
agriculture, wage labor at the nearby distillery, and wage labor in regional construction. 
Fishing shifts from the primary income generator in the wet season to a mostly 
supplemental subsistence activity in the dry season when wage labor often provides most 
Income. 
Artisanals informally define individual fishing territories on Rio Grande. There is 
no evidence of any other communal property rights present. An informal management 
system based on these individual territories exists according to fishers. Individual 
territories are recognized informally between fishers, who also resist encroachment by 
outsiders whose lines are cut if caught fishing from shore. 
Outsider encroachment in this case is mostly tourist / recreational fisher 
encroachment. Tourism increased sharply during the late 1970s and has resulted in 
conflict between tourists and artisanals over individual fishing territories, mostly during 
the transition between the wet and dry seasons. Tourists that fish from the shoreline often 
cast their lines into the artisanals' territories as they move more towards the artisanals' 
traditional fishing areas away from the shorelines adjacent to the vacation homes and 
developing tourist spots downstream. 
The authors and fishers interviewed in this case study do not directly deem this 
CPR management system as a success or failure. However, there is ample evidence to 
deem it failing considering the three main criteria. Environmentally, 'the highly priced and 
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sought-after first grade fish such as 'pintado' have decreased in abundance over two 
decades. During this decline in first grade fish, a hydroelectric plant was built upstream in 
the town of Marimbondo in 1974. General fish mortality has increased since. 
Economically, the most abundant fish are now all second grade (and lower priced) 
species. Artisanals struggle to harvest any grade fish during dry season and most are 
increasingly turning to wage labor to maintain a primary income. Socially, there has been 
reports of not only artisanals outmigrating from the communities, but also of intra-group 
conflict increasing with decreases in valued fish to catch. Disputes. over individual 
territories have also occurred. 
Rio Grande is the one case study that is generally failing across the three criteria. 
Although artisanals have created property rights and an informal management system, it 
does not exhibit many of the model design principles that are found in the more 
successful case studies. Only two of the ten principles are found at Rio Grande, compared 
to the other case studies that exhibit at least half or more. Most of these model 
management institutions are not present and there are few similarities between the other 
forms of outsider encroachment detailed in the other studies and tourist fisher 
encroachment present in this case. Therefore, this case study is eliminated from the 
analysis concerning resilient management in the second research question. 
CHAPTER V 
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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This chapter synthesizes the qualitative data from the seven case studies for the 
purpose of answering the two research questions of this paper. Section 5.1 addresses the 
first research question by consolidating the data on the management design principles 
(outlined in the consolidated model of principles) across the case studies. Section 5.2 
addresses the second research question by summarizing the importance of 'shoreline 
activities' in artisanal fishing communities and analyzing how these activities affect the 
continued existence and functioning of traditional management institutions in the face of 
outsider encroachment. Section 5.3 provides a brief synthesis of the main arguments and 
discussion of the results. Section 5.4 concludes with a discussion on the limitations of the 
case study data and suggestions on how those limitations can be improved upon in future 
research. 
The case studies show that there are unique cultural and social patterns in 
artisanal fishery communities that promote resiliency in the face of external threats such 
as commercial encroachment. The case study approach has proven very useful in 
identifying and illuminating the questions of common-property and the management 
institutional structures that lead to success or failure in dealing with ePRs (Burger, et. al. 
2001). 
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5.1: Research Question #1 
This section consolidates the descriptive data from the seven case studies 
concerning the ten principles of the synthesized model outlined in chapter II (see Table 
4). This first research question is: do the often cited Ostrom (1990) and Baland and 
Platteau (1996) models for informal CPR management hold up in the case of Latin 
American fisheries? Each principle is briefly discussed by outlining which case studies 
exhibit that respective principle as a sort of 'test' of the model. This will help determine 
whether the six successful case studies exhibit all, most, or a certain set of principles 
compared to the one unsuccessful case study (Rio Grande). Elaboration is provided on 
certain case studies that exhibit uniquely effective or ineffective results concerning each 
respective principle. 
1. Clearly Defined Boundaries 
The first criterion for successful CPR management is that the boundaries of the 
resource be clearly established. All seven case studies, even the one deemed 
'unsuccessful' exhibit clearly defined boundaries that are informally recognized and 
adhered to by most local fishers. There are two types of boundaries covered by this 
design principle. First, when individual and / or communal rights to territories exist, the 
boundaries of those territories must be coherent and collectively recognized by users. 
Also, the entire CPR itself (within which those individual and / or communal rights exist) 
must be highly coherent and collectively recognized. Three case studies (Bahia, 
Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca) show the most rigid and collectively recognized boundaries 
concerning the entire CPR area under informal management relative to the other case 
studies. However, all seven cases do exhibit highly coherent boundaries on both 
individual and communal territories. 
2. Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions 
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The second criterion for successful CPR management is basically that there be 
rules in place that restrict technologies and / or harvesting amounts that are not 
appropriate for the user group given the environmental, economi<;, and social conditions 
of the CPR and the user group. Six of the seven case studies show high congruence in 
their appropriation and provision rules (Bahia, Baixo, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de 
Janiero / Sao Paulo States, Rio Grande). 
The Coqueiral and Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States case studies show that 
technology diffusion from outsiders occurs mainly when it is congruent with local 
ecological and social conditions. For example, opportunities to integrate more advanced 
boats by the raft fishermen of Coqueiral were rationally discarded as not being potentially 
as congruent with maneuvering in the swampy coastal areas of the northern Brazilian 
coast despite the more sturdy and advanced structures ofthe boats (Forman 1970). 
In the Baixo case study, varzeiros developed access rules that are congruent with 
local conditions. The drastic shifts in floodwater levels and seasonality in the Baixo led 
varzieros to collectively enforce restrictions on gillnets during the most productive parts 
of the year in order to maintain enough catch during less productive times when the 
floodwaters recede and they must compete with commercial fishers' on the rivers. 
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The Bahia, Lake Titicaca, and Rio Grande cases show high congruence especially 
concerning technology provisions appropriate for local conditions. The one case that 
shows less is the Caye Caulker case. The rapid increases in imported technology through 
high returns on lobster sales have contributed to this. There exist few to no informal 
mechanisms for restricting technological advancement and there is a growing potential 
for over-exploitation, over-saturation, and non-congruence at Caye Caulker. 
3. Collective-Choice Arrangements 
The third criterion for successful CPR management is that decision-making 
processes concerning creating and changing rules are inclusive of the entire user group. 
Six of the seven case studies show high levels of inclusiveness in collective decision-
making (Bahia, Baixo, Caye Caulker, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero / Sao 
Paulo States). In these six cases, there were few fishers that had claimed to have been 
unjustly excluded from the informal fishers' organizations. Those that do complain of 
discrimination are recognized by active fishers as having deserved such social sanctions 
because they had broken informal rules (see the next two principles, monitoring and 
sanctions). Fishers report few problems with inclusiveness in these cases. 
The Rio Grande case study illustrates a case where collective decisions are less 
inclusive. With high rates of outmigration of artisanal fishers to other communities (often 
for wage labor) collective-choice arrangements are beginning to disintegrate. The main 
factor here is technology. While most of the fishers have adhered to technological 
provisions congruent with their Amazonian riverine ecosystem, a few artisanals have 
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turned small-scale by leasing motorized boats from newly formed local boat rental shops 
that are serving mostly tourists. These fishers have gone outside the user group to acquire 
such motorized tech and this has caused the erosion of informal management 
enforcement and inclusion. 
4. Monitoring 
The fourth criterion for successful CPR management is that monitors exist, are 
collectively recognized, and are accountable to the other users. MQIlitoring 
responsibilities include watching other users' activities while they use the CPR in order 
to prevent any rulebreaking and also watching for community outsiders that are not 
supposed to use the CPR. Five of the seven case studies exhibit effective monitoring 
mechanisms that hold members accountable to the other fishers through effective 
collective-choice arrangements (Bahia, Baixo, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero / 
Sao Paulo States). 
In Bahia, 'mestres' are experienced and respected artisanals that constitute 
leadership in beirados' informal management system. They are the group most 
responsible for monitoring, not only for the lunar-tide cycles that determine where 
territories are to be setup, but also for community outsiders and rulebreakers on the 
waters. 
At Lake Titicaca, totora reed bed collection is a major factor in monitoring. 
Totora reeds grow in what are often termed 'sunken gardens' (or 'reed beds') that stand 
adjacent to the shoreline of fishing communities. The collection of tot ora reeds promotes 
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monitoring for outsiders on the community fishing territory. Also, artisanal fishers are 
very familiar with each other since they tend to fish solo on their own separate craft and 
average over 200 fishing trips out 'on the water' each year. The recognizability of 
traditional fishers and the shoreline activity of totora collection promote informal 
monitoring at Lake Titicaca. The Baixo, Coqueiral, and Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States 
cases all have systems that rely on well-known and respected fishers (as in Bahia) whose 
job is to watch for rulebreakers and monitor weather patterns. 
By contrast, the Caye Caulker case has no monitoring mecpanisms, but effective 
graduated sanctions. Caye Caulker lobster fishers have historically had a small portion of 
their daily catch stolen from their traps by a few long-time community members and 
some regular outsiders that enter the community. It is common for a fisher to retrieve his 
traps and find at least one or two of them being empty. This is contributed to the lack of 
monitoring mechanisms discussed earlier. The lack of monitoring has resulted in this 
small 'robber economy' allowing a few certain individuals to routinely steal a few 
lobsters per day. Over the years these robbers have been spotted inadvertently at various 
times and have become the 'known thieves' of the community. Since fishers have at least 
40 traps or more that they retrieve daily, this is not a big enough dent in their livelihood 
to necessarily implement monitoring mechanisms to keep eye on such robbers. Fishers 
here tend to view the time and energy costs of monitoring as outweighing the benefits of 
saving a few lobster per day since Caye Caulker lobster are so highly demanded, sell at 
such high prices across scales, and catch amounts are rather steady. 
In the Rio Grande case, fishers show neither monitoring mechanisms nor 
graduated sanctions. With a riverine fishery that has a smaller CPR area than the other 
cases, it seems as though this is one reason why individual fishers have not been given 
specific responsibilities of monitoring. 
5. Graduated Sanctions 
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The fifth criterion for successful CPR management is that graduated sanctions 
(punishments) exist and are enforced appropriately considering the, seriousness of the 
offense. Six of the seven case studies exhibit graduated sanctions where active social 
ostracization or other informal methods of punishing known rulebreakers effectively keep 
these rulebreakers from repeating a similar act (Bahia, Baixo, Caye Caulker, Coqueiral, 
Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States). 
In Bahia, sanctions are brought against rulebreakers that fish in territories not 
their own. Sanctions include sabotaging equipment and crossing or entangling nets. The 
lack of monitoring at Caye Caulker was discussed earlier and how 'known thieves' are 
present and tolerated as long as they only take a certain small portion of an otherwise 
bountiful harvest. However, strong collective mechanisms exist to socially ostracize 
thieves and ensure they never gain membership in the NFCS cooperative. When a 
'known thief does take an extraordinary amount, fishers have been known to extract 
revenge in some cases. 
At Lake Titicaca, sanctions are brought against outsiders who crossover 
communal territory boundaries. A survey of 251 local artisanals with- follow-ups on 
reported victims of sanctioning verifies the existence of such mechanisms. The Baixo, 
Coqueiral, and Rio de Janiero I Sao Paulo States cases show similar evidence of 
sanctioning mechanisms. However, Rio Grande artisanals seem to have lower levels of 
sanctioning compared to the other six cases. 
6. Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms 
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The sixth criterion for successful CPR management is that there be specific 
mechanisms for resolving conflict between users that are accessib~e to most, if not all 
users in the group. Five of the seven case studies show strong informal mechanisms for 
resolving user group conflicts. The Bahia and Rio de Janiero I Sao Paulo States cases 
show the most intricate management institutional arrangements. In the Rio de Janiero I 
Sao Paulo States case, there are two main types of Caicaras conflict resolution 
mechanisms depending on which community one is in. One is based on a kinship lineage 
system, where elderly men who are well respected provide the final say in collective 
action decision-making and disputes. The other type is based on participation and 
experience, where the same sort of mechanisms exist, but management leadership is 
based not as much on age, but on a history as an active participant in collective resource 
management. 
In Bahia, when disputes arise among beirados, 'aconselheiros' ('mediators') are 
sought after to resolve conflicts. Aconselheiros are either retired and well-respected 
fishers or sometimes even the widows of retired fishers. These aconselheiros are 
informally placed in such a respected position collectively by beirados due to their vast 
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fishing and community experience and have been successful in maintaining high levels of 
'respeito' among beirados with little intra-group splintering. 
The Baixo and Rio Grande cases show relatively weak conflict resolution 
mechanisms. Varzeiros fishers in the Baixo region are successful and exhibit a majority 
of the other model principles, but access to conflict resolution seems weak as there is 
some evidence of internal and external conflict persisting in a few cases. Conflict-
resolution mechanisms, especially concerning insiders v. commercial outsiders, are less 
well developed and there has been evidence of increased conflict sjnce the arrival of 
commercial encroachers on the rivers. This may be a signal that while other effective 
management institutions of the varzeiros have shown resiliency in the face of external 
threats, conflict-resolution mechanisms are perhaps the exception and have broken down 
with increased pressure from urban outsiders entering their isolated rural communities. At 
Rio Grande, artisanals are increasingly involved in conflict within their artisanal user 
group concerning access to motorized technology and with respect to recreational fishing 
tourists on-shore. This weakening or absence of conflict-resolution mechanisms is 
perhaps due to the growing technological dualism between artisanal and a few small-
scale fishers. Such increased dualism may result in more differences and splintering 
between the fishers that are converting to small-scale technology. 
7. State Tolerance of Local Management Systems 
The seventh criterion for successful CPR management is that local management 
institutions are not seriously challenged or threatened by external government authorities. 
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While the Lake Titicaca case reveals some efforts by the state to thwart informal/local 
management systems and implement their own system, all seven case studies do exhibit 
informal management systems and even in the Lake Titicaca case, are experiencing little 
to weak enforcement by the state. Even in the Brazilian coastal cases (Bahia, Coqueiral, 
Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States) where the Brazilian government technically and legally 
can enforce their 'ocean as public property' law, the state does not possess the necessary 
resources to effectively fund formal enforcement mechanisms. 
The remaining cases also show that while the state is not lipked or integrated 
operationally with local informal systems, these governments have historically tolerated 
these systems. Thus, a relationship of 'separated tolerance' is perhaps the best way to 
describe these case studies (excluding the Lake Titicaca case) since the states are not 
legitimizing these informal management systems, but are also not attempting to enforce 
their own state property rights or management institutions to supercede local institutions. 
Again, this is often due to a lack of capital to fund regional and local fishery councils and 
other formal enforcement mechanisms. 
8. Users' Demands for the Resource 
The eighth criterion for successful CPR management is that there be high demand 
for the resource from users and that the resource is perceived as a vital contributor to their 
continued survival. All seven case studies show high demand for the resource by users. 
These fisheries are either the main provider of subsistence and income for local families 
in a line of other natural resource work (Baixo, Lake Titicaca, Rio de- Janiero / Sao Paulo 
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States, Rio Grande) or are nearly the exclusive provider of subsistence and income and 
constitute almost all labor inputs (Bahia, Caye Caulker, Coqueiral). Whether substantially 
engaged in natural resource use pluralism or not, these fisheries provide the majority of 
subsistence and income for these local families. 
9. User Knowledge of Sustainable Yields 
The ninth criterion for successful CPR management is that users exhibit high 
knowledge of the amount of resource units that can be extracted wbile allowing for that 
same amount to be extracted into the future. The highest user knowledge seems to be 
among the Caicaras fishers in the Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States case. High traditional 
ecological knowledge (TEK) is present among the Caicaras and indigenous maybe the 
distinguishing factor for this principle as the Caicaras are the only Indian fisher group out 
of the seven case studies. There is partial evidence for other groups, such as the 
northeastern Brazilian artisanals in the Bahia and Coqueiral cases having specific TEK in 
areas besides sustainable yields (such as seasonal weather patterns, tide shifts, how ocean 
bottom content affects species catch and migration, and so forth). However, the data on 
sustainable yields in these specific studies remains somewhat incomplete and 
inconclusive. 
J O. Mutual Obligation and Concern for Social Reputation between Users 
The tenth criterion for successful CPR management is that there be a strong sense 
of concern and commitment for mutual obligation between users. This is quite similar to 
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the concept of 'reciprocity'. Reciprocity, like mutual obligation, is an act of exchange 
between two persons, acts of self-sacrifice or unsolicited kindness. In a small-scale 
fishing community, some examples include buying a beer or meal for another fisher or 
potential fisher, offering to carry materials or offer materials to help repair one another's 
boat or net, sharing portion of a day's catch when a fisher experiences a surplus (Pollnac 
1991). Such acts need not necessarily be immediately 'repaid' by the recipient and can 
take a variety of forms. 
Five of the seven cases exhibit high levels of reciprocity between users (Bahia, 
Baixo, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero / Sao Paulo States) compared to the two 
other cases (Caye Caulker, Rio Grande). The highest reciprocity levels are in two cases 
that also exhibit almost all of the other model principles (Bahia and Lake Titicaca). This 
reciprocal exchange is one main factor that accounts for resiliency of the other effective 
management institutions across the five case studies. Factors that account for reciprocity 
in these cases, such as robust shoreline activities, are elaborated on in the next section. 
5.2: Research Question #2 
This section attempts to answer the second research question by expanding the 
arguments on what accounts for adaptive responses and resiliency of effective 
management institutions. The second research question is: what factors increase the 
resilience of local management systems in the face of pressures from commercial 
encroachment in Latin American small-scale fisheries? Adaptive management responses 
are present in the five case studies where moderate to high levels of fisher reciprocity are 
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also present. In such cases with high reciprocity, especially in the Bahia, Coqueiral, and 
Lake Titicaca examples, this reciprocity is influenced by shoreline activities. 
Adaptive Responses and Resilient Management 
Many adaptive responses by artisanal fishers involve defining and negotiating in-
shore (near-shore) waters as their fishing territory. Such a response is only a first step, but 
since artisanal technology often prohibits distant water fishing from the shoreline, many 
remain within a mile of the shore when on the waters (McGoodwill 1990). When coastal 
lagoons and 'caye' islands dot the coastal shoreline, these often act as unofficial 
boundaries between 'in-shore' and 'off-shore' waters (Cordell 1984, King 2000, 
Sutherland 1986). Thus, in the cases of reciprocity and effective informal management 
institutions, small-scale and artisanal fishers respond first by defining and negotiating 
access to in-shore waters with commercial fleets. These agreements may allow the 
commercial sector to operate on the more distant waters off-shore from the community. 
Adaptive responses that promote resiliency in the face of outsider encroachment, 
including the successful defense of in-shore waters and traditional fishing territories, are 
influenced by two main factors. The first is reciprocity and the other is that the benefits of 
relying on traditional territorial use and management systems outweigh the costs of 
keeping them. The existence of high user group reciprocity and situations where the 
perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs of continued use and informal 
management of the fishery promote the adaptive responses that constitute resiliency. 
More specifically: 
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• Reciprocity is highly dependent on robust shoreline activities often found in 
artisanal fishing communities. These activities provide the opportunity 
contexts within which reciprocal exchange is first offered and then repeated to 
create reciprocity networks. Artisanal fishers will often rely on such reciprocal 
exchange concerning labor activities because of the high risks and 
uncertainties associated with fishing outlined in previous chapters. 
• Cost-benefit analysis includes two main variables: costs of defending 
territories is shared more or less equally between users~ the perception of 
benefits of maintaining traditional management versus the perception of 
benefits possible by allowing outsiders to enter and alter that system must side 
with traditional management. 
In cases of robust shoreline activities and where perceived benefits outweigh perceived 
costs by local fishers, adaptive responses to outsider encroachment do exist. Shoreline 
activities are especially robust in three case studies showing the highest levels of 
reciprocity and resiliency (Bahia, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca). 
In the case study that is not showing resiliency in the face of outsider 
encroachment, Caye Caulker (where outsiders are encroaching on traditional territories 
and little to no defense responses from local fishers are occurring) the two main factors of 
shoreline activities and benefits outweighing costs are not present. Since the Caye 
Caulker fishers are almost all motorized 'small-scale' (and not artisanal), concentrated 
shoreline activities have not been as robust as in most other case studies with higher 
percentages of artisanal fishers. Also, there are two main factors that'have uniquely 
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influenced Caye Caulker fishing that are not present in the other cases. The first is that 
lobster is a unique and highly demanded species that is connected to globalized markets 
and has generated relatively high economic returns. The cooperative organization 
instituted by local fishers themselves has actually helped by maintaining strong market 
positions through collective action and creating relatively strong backward economic 
linkages. With lobster prices rising, each fisher has seen a rapid jump in income along 
with the fisher cooperative group as a whole. 
This rapid influx of capital has influenced the second factor concerning cost-
benefit analysis, the rapid rise in the use of sophisticated fishing technology. Recent 
influxes of monetary capital have been used to purchase new technology. Technology has 
thwarted traditional territories since they expanded the exploitation capabilities of some 
local fishers. High economic returns from lobster resulted in higher intra-group and 
community social stratification between cooperative and non-cooperative fishers. With 
such luxuries, some of these fishers now see more costs than benefits in maintaining 
traditional management practices and territories. 
Also with higher financial returns, fishers are now able to pay for their sons' 
formal education in Belize City or abroad and send them off to school instead of teaching 
them fishing techniques and handing down their property rights. As King documented in 
1997, the next generation are beginning to out-migrate, threatening the familial line of 
traditional fishing. Since fathers have no family member to pass their territory on to, 
increasingly small-scale fishers are selling their fishing territories to community 
outsiders. These outsiders are usually either regional migrants that want to break into 
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fishing or representatives of private fish marketers who wish to contract with a fisher to 
exploit lobster and sell directly to them for a lower price. 
Informal management institutions are breaking down at Caye Caulker with 
increasing outsider control of fishing territories. The two main factors influencing this 
breakdown are the high influxes of capital from a highly demanded lobster species and 
the increased use of imported technology. This technology increase has led to accessible 
waters being exploited to the point that most fishers say it is not worth the costs of 
traveling out to farther off-shore waters to attempt and find new t~rritories. 
Unlike at Caye Caulker where new technology broke down traditional 
management systems, technology produced a different result in Coqueiral. Because it was 
congruent with local conditions and control over technological innovations was regulated 
by local 'big-wigs', jangadieros were able to institute informal technology restriction 
mechanisms to collectively control their adoption of new technologies. The local land-
owning 'big-wigs' at the top of the Coqueiral social and economic hierarchy are often the 
ones that have the external connections and capital for new forms of technology. Thus, 
they are often the ones that introduce new technology to the peasants in the community, 
and unless these new technologies are congruent with the jangadieros' traditional 
practices and ecological fishing conditions, they do not adopt it. 
Shoreline Activities 
It is crucial when analyzing artisanal fishers and the operation of the fishery to 
distinguish between 'on the water' work activities (fishing, gathering nets, etc.) and 'off 
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the water' shoreline work activities (McGoodwin 1990, Pollnac 1991, Acheson 1981). 
Shoreline work activities are an important characteristic unique to artisanal fishing that 
set it apart from other sectors of fishing and from other natural resource sector work. 
While the stereotypical view of fishers involves the 'on-water' work of gathering fish, the 
reality is that most of their time is spent 'on-shore' (Pollnac 1991). Artisanal fishers 
spend time and energy 'off the waters' gathering, building, and maintaining / repairing 
their fishing technology (McGoodwin 1990). 
This intimately relates back to two points discussed earlier. In the first place, 
artisanal fishers rely on non-motorized and simple fishing technology (boats, nets, hooks, 
lines, and so on) often made by hand from locally gathered materials. The use oflocal 
materials reflects a lack of the necessary financial capital to purchase or import synthetic 
materials. In addition, artisanal fishers most often perform their 'on the water' labor 
during one stretch of time, whether overnight (as discussed earlier) or at other hours. A 
day's fishing trip 'on the waters' varies in length depending on numerous factors such as 
type of technology used, seasonal period offish availability, and many of the other 
ecological factors previously mentioned. The point is since most artisanal fishing trips are 
done in one stretch of time seldom lasting more than one-third to one-half of the day, that 
leaves the rest of the day or night to the gathering, building, and maintaining of artisanal 
fishing technology. 
The two most common used materials to construct fishing craft by artisanal 
fishers are wood and reeds (although aluminum and other materials are sometimes used). 
A reed is a finger-thin, flexible / bendable, greenish-brown fiber that can grow in tightly 
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packed bunches of dozens or more in marsh mixtures of salt and fresh waters that often 
exist adjacent to coastal shorelines (Chapman 2003). Reeds see heavy use in Latin 
America in ecosystems where wood does not grow or is not closely available, such as 
before wood was imported to the Lake Titicaca region of Peru and currently on the 
hyperarid desert coast of Peru in artisanal fishing communities such as Huanchaco and 
Chiclayo where wood does not exist (Orlove 2002, Chapman 2003). Since they grow and 
thrive in such marsh and floodplain type environments, reeds are easily grown along 
coastal shorelines of oceans, large lakes, and even rivers where such ecological 
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conditions exist. 
How close such materials are to the shoreline will also influence the amount of 
their use for fishing purposes. Costs of gathering and carrying such wood or reed 
materials are lessened the closer they are to shore. Artisanal fishing technology tends to 
degenerate quickly, especially for maritime fishers who have to deal with higher 
concentrations of rough and corrosive salt water (Acheson 1981). Reeds often exhibit 
faster deterioration than wood and reed craft. The hand-woven 'caballitos de totora' of 
Huanchaco and Chiclayo Peru corrode so rapidly that they are replaced an average of 
every 30 to 40 days by the fishers (Balagna 2002, Chapman 2003). Constructing a new 
craft every month or few months, along with the constant maintenance of re-tying and 
stitching fishnets, gathering used soda bottles to use as bobbers, gathering nearby wood 
or reeds and carrying it to shore, and setting up finished craft on-shore are all just some of 
the shoreline labor activities often done during mid-day by artisanal fishers (McGoodwin 
1990). 
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One reason why these activities take place on the shoreline is because it is less 
costly to gather the materials that are already close to shore and work with them there 
instead of constantl y hauling these materials (when in the case of wood and reeds for 
craft can be quite large bundles weighing upwards of hundreds of pounds) back and forth 
between a fishers' residence (which can sometimes be quite distant if engaging in natural 
resource use pluralism and farming inland) and the shoreline. Since the fishing 
technology is used for 'on the water' labor, then it is advantageous to keep such 
cumbersome gear as close to the water as possible. This is one re,ason why in many 
artisanal fishing communities, craft can be seen standing upright leaned up against 
barricades or shoreline walls that separate nearby shoreline roads or tracks from the sand 
beach. In other contexts, artisanal fishers store their wood boats in the water tied to shore 
docks or some other stable device on shore by rope. 
There are other labor inputs not directly associated with the actual harvesting of 
the extracted unit in other natural resource sectors such as agriculture, pastoralism, and 
forestry. However, the specific dynamics of shoreline activities with artisanal fishing are 
quite unique and set it apart from these other natural resource sectors and apart from 
other fishing sectors as well. It is these shoreline activities that not only account for the 
majority of artisanal fisher labor, but it is also this unique spatial and temporal quality to 
labor that promotes strong informal reciprocity bonds between fishers (McGoodwin 
1990, McGoodwin 2001). Working on fishing technology along the shoreline can 
influence reciprocal exchanges of labor and goods between fishers. These shoreline 
activities associated with artisanal fishing coupled with benefits outweighing costs in 
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maintaining traditional management institutions may account for the adaptive responses 
in times of external threat. 
So what exactly are 'shoreline reciprocity networks' in regards to artisanal 
fishing? Artisanal fishers spend most of their work time not on the waters fishing, but on 
the shoreline gathering, building, and repairing their fishing technology as discussed 
earlier (Pollnac 1991). This is the context in which reciprocity occurs (Cordell 1984, 
Forman 1970, OrIove 2002). Examples of 'shoreline reciprocity' are vast and include acts 
both on the waters fishing and non-fishing activities (McGoodw~n 1990). Reciprocity 
networks are built between certain fishers that are either kin or have developed a 
friendship (often based on networks of kin ties) (Cordell 1984, Cordell and McKean 
1992). This reciprocity in practice increases each fishers' opportunities to show their 
worth through acts of self-sacrifice and also allows each to measure the worth and 'sense 
of fair play' involved with other fishers (Cordell 1984). 
It is crucial to distinguish between types of reciprocities. Sahlins' (1972) typology 
serves as a guidepost to distinguish between three basic types of reciprocities: 
generalized, balanced, and negative. These three types differ across three variables: 
immediacy (in practice as well as in expectation) of returns, equivalence of returns, and 
the material and mechanical dimensions of exchange. 
In the five case studies exhibiting high reciprocity, this reciprocity is most often 
times balanced. There is an expectation of return without which will result in social 
consequences such as loss of rights or ostracization. There is almost always an 
expectation of equal to near equal return depending on the ability of the indebted fisher to 
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'repay' (Cordell 1984). However, this shoreline reciprocity in the five case studies does 
not meet the ideal criteria of 'perfect' or 'precise' balanced reciprocity since exchange 
rarely occurs without delay and it is expected that time will pass before a reciprocal act is 
repaid. The giver of such acts often remembers acts of self-sacrifice and it is this 
cognitive mechanism that serves as the informal measure of trust and worth of fellow 
fishers in these case studies. 
Such reciprocity is one major factor that accounts for the responsiveness and 
inclusiveness of collective action mechanisms required for succe§sful informal CPR 
management, especially in response to pressures for change. When there is a high sense 
of reciprocity present in a fisher community, the fishers are more likely to respond 
rapidly, promote inclusiveness in decision-making, and incorporate observational 
information from more fishers in decision-making. 
5.3: Conclusion and Implications 
Table 7 summarizes the presence or absence of CPR model principles (from Table 
4) across the case studies. The six successful Latin American artisanal case studies 
exhibited a majority of the model principles (six or above, most had at least eight) while 
the one unsuccessful/failing case study exhibited the lowest number of these principles, 
only four. The case studies support the validity of Ostrom's ideal-type CPR management 
principles. However, the additional factors added by Baland and Platteau are only 
partially supported. Three of the Baland and Platteau additional principles were 
discounted beforehand ('costs of exclusion technology', 'physical overlap between the 
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CPR and users' residences', and 'size ') due to the first two being incongruent with 
fisheries and 'size' being discounted because of theoretical questions raised by other 
scholars. One of the remaining three, 'knowledge of sustainable yields' is inconclusive. 
However, the remaining two Baland and Platteau principles, 'user demands for the 
resource' and 'mutual obligation' seem to be supported by the case studies. The physical 
environment and specific institutional factors from Ostrom's model are influential in 
promoting effective informal artisanal fishery management. In addition, the two 
characteristics of the user group cited by Baland and Platteau are.influential as well. 
While these models of design principles have been empirically tested, they have 
not been thoroughly examined specifically concerning Latin America or Latin American 
artisanal fisheries before this analysis. Schlager and Ostrom (1993) represents one of the 
most thorough tests of Ostrom's model in a comparative analysis of thirty artisanal and 
small-scale coastal fishery case studies worldwide from a variety of first and third world 
regions. Their study is primarily concerned with examining variation among fishers that 
hold more or less 'powerful' bundles of rights. Their findings show that fishers holding 
rights of exclusion and transferability over their territory or within the larger fishery itself 
are much more successful at reducing conflict and assignment problems and limiting 
technological externalities. Their work evaluates how certain property rights 
arrangements in a fishery influence success across a range of environmental, economic, 
and social criteria. They find that different levels of rights held by users affect 
management effectiveness. In general, Ostrom's model is supported by their results. 
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The present analysis complements their study by focusing on Latin America and 
expands their discussion on how resilience of management institutions is achieved. The 
results seem to indicate that while Ostrom's model is strong, parts of the Baland and 
Platteau model may not be generalizable across the fishery sector. However, Baland and 
Platteau do add perhaps the most crucial factor in regards to the promoting resilience of 
the other principles, that being 'mutual obligation' / 'reciprocity'. 
The failed case study specifically lacks the more 'community' and inclusive 
mechanisms such as effective collective-choice arrangements, mqnitoring, sanctioning, 
and conflict resolution measures (along with exhibiting high 'mutual obligation') that 
most of the other more successful cases exhibit. These management institutions require 
high levels of intra-group trust and the tenth factor of 'mutual obligation' seem to be the 
most crucial in determining the three broad criteria of success and maintaining traditional 
fishery management. 
An interesting note to research question #2, the cases also show a major 
commonality in that there are fewer costs associated with transferring individual property 
rights / fishing territories when these individual territories are based in high homogeneity 
(family / kin) networks. Five ofthe seven case studies show that when the user group is 
highly homogeneous in terms of familial relations, transferring rights inter-generationally 
has historically been effective discounting any large influxes of capital and / or adoption 
of technologies (Bahia, Caye Caulker, Coqueiral, Lake Titicaca, Rio de Janiero / Sao 
Paulo States). Homogeneity in this particular context seems to facilitate the longevity of 
property rights systems and can also increase perceived benefits when facing costs 
associated with defending territories. 
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The results suggest that CPR management institutional design and procedures do 
matter in regards to the overall success and stability of fisheries. However, fishery 
shoreline activities influence reciprocity networks and strengthen effective adaptive 
responses of defending in-shore territories from various types of outsider encroachment. 
Shoreline activities and in-shore territories are two unique 'spatial elements' ofartisanal 
fishing communities that need to be taken into account when analyzing resilience of 
traditional livelihoods in the face of outsider encroachment and other forms of external 
threat. 
5.4: Study Limitations and Future Research 
A vailability of relevant data has been a limitation of this report. As a masters 
degree student lacking the funds to support original field research, I have had to rely on 
published scholarly journals and books to provide case study data. I have had access to 
Utah State University libraries, University of Utah libraries, and an inter-library loan 
system for searching and gathering Latin American artisanal fishery case studies. I feel 
that I have covered all of the readily available cases of research on artisanal fisheries in 
Latin America. Nevertheless, I may have unintentionally missed some appropriate and 
relevant studies, such as those presented in unpublished manuscripts or data reports 
sitting in other libraries. 
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This limited availability of published research has influenced the time and spatial 
scope and significance of the data as well. Two cases, Bahia and Coqueiral, are at least 
three decades old and although two of the cases are longitudinal (Caye Caulker and Lake 
Titicaca), none have data within a half-decade of this report. Therefore the significance of 
the results for early 21 sl century fishing industry dynamics may be limited by changes in 
the underlying social, political, and market conditions. As stated above, these studies are 
defined as a success or failure by the given criteria at the time of data collection. As a 
result, it is not known if the 'success' documented above has exten.ded into more recent 
periods. 
It would certainly be interesting and fruitful for future researchers to return to one 
or more of these study sites and document what change has occurred. The arguments on 
destabilization vs. integration outlined in chapter III could be a crucial focus of such 
analyses. Also, one could examine if more technologies among commercial fishing fleets 
have had new and more potent impacts on traditional management systems. Are those 
traditional management institutions that continued to exist a few months to years after the 
first signs of commercial encroachment still in existence and operating effectively? Have 
they been replaced by different informal management institutions adapted to a new 
context of survival or competition with commercial fleets? If commercial fleets continued 
to exist in and around the community fishery, there is a greater chance that artisanal 
fishers are more likely to have been integrated into these commercial networks. 
Future research could also improve upon the spatial limitations of this report in 
three respects. First, access to a wider range of works could allow fof. a wider 
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geographical range of studies to be selected. Four of the seven cases in this report are 
from coastal Brazil and two are from Peru, leaving many Latin American nations and 
their respective fisheries unrepresented. A wider sample could allow for more confidence 
that the observed patterns are typical of the Latin American region. A larger sample could 
also examine differences in the various types of Latin America fisheries (e.g., maritime, 
riverine, and lake). For example, in-shore territories such as mangrove swamps and 
'caye' islands might be easier for artisanals to defend from outside encroachment. 
Finally, since there is one case study in this report (Caye Caulker, Beljze) that can also 
technically be classified as 'Caribbean' because of its heavily English-speaking 
population and historical cultural roots linked more to black Caribbean populations, 
cultural arguments concerning reciprocity and shoreline activities specific to the Latin 
American region are difficult. Building a theory of cultural elements common to Latin 
American small-scale fisheries is not possible in this report. 
Most of all, future studies should focus on the relationships among adaptive 
management, reciprocity network structures and shoreline activities. Distinguishing 
between types of reciprocity found in these types of artisanal fisher groups and focusing 
more on how shoreline reciprocity networks arise, persist, and change would add to the 
artisanal fishery literature. While this report has often sacrificed in-depth analysis on 
certain topics for a more general review of various literatures, a detailed case study on 
reciprocity network dynamics and structure would help verify and extend the arguments 
presented here. 
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Future research would also be able to examine two other issues that were ignored 
in this report. First, the larger community context within which fishing sub-communities 
exist should be examined in more detail. This would entail gathering details on the 
dynamics between larger community social relations and how those affect fisher group 
relations. Also, research is needed on the emerging trend of tourism development in third 
world fishing communities that are 'physically attractive' and offer high-amenities to 
foreign tourists. Specifically, the effect of tourism on economic linkages across segments 
of the fishing industry and an evaluation of how it might support or marginalize 
traditional forms of resource use (such as small-scale fishing) will influence whether 
tourism serves as possible stable form of future economic development in these regions. 
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